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A FLEXIBLE HEALTH CARE WORKFORCE REQUIRES
A FLEXIBLE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT:
PROMOTING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION
THROUGH REGULATORY REFORM
Andrew I. Gavil* & Tara Isa Koslov**
Abstract: Effective competition policy is critical to the success of U.S. health care
reform, including efforts to reduce health care costs, increase quality of care, and expand
access to health care services. While promoting competition is necessary at every level of the
rapidly evolving health care system, it is particularly important with respect to licensed
professionals who provide health care services. This Article argues that the current system of
health care professional regulation, born of the last century, is in numerous respects an
impediment to the kinds of changes needed to fully unleash the benefits of competition
among different types of health care service providers. To the contrary, the current system of
licensure and related regulations tends to artificially separate professionals in ways that not
only insulate them from competition now, but also generate incentives to use regulation to
perpetuate and fortify such insulation in the future. Drawing on analytic principles derived
from antitrust law enforcement and other regulated industries, the Article argues that,
although some regulation is necessary to protect public health and safety, the legacy
regulatory system likely impedes the development of innovative, alternate service models
that might facilitate enhanced competition by allowing all professionals to practice to the full
extent of their education, licensure, and skill. The Article concludes by proposing a range of
reforms that would re-conceptualize the core characteristics and methodology of traditional
health care professional regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
The American health care system is in the midst of a major
transformation. The structure of the industry is in flux as payment
methods evolve and innovative care delivery systems emerge, leading
not only to new relationships among payers, providers, and patients, but
also to novel business models.1 All of these factors—combined with
1. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) conducted workshops in 2014 and in 2015 (the latter
jointly with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice) to explore a wide range of
issues, including many that relate to this Article. See Examining Health Care Competition, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/03/examining-healthcare-competition [https://perma.cc/PQP6-DQDU] (last visited Feb. 1, 2016); Examining Health
Care Competition Workshop, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-
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ongoing changes in provider education, certification, and licensure—
have complicated the answer to a central question in the health care
marketplace: which health care professionals can safely, effectively, and
efficiently provide for each component of the broad range of patients’
health care needs?
This Article examines one key component of the U.S. health care
system: competition between health care service providers, especially
health care professionals. Varied and regulated professionals deliver an
ever-widening range of health care services to patients, in many different
settings and at every level of care. While each profession is in certain
respects discrete, the scope of practice of each category of caregiver is
likely to overlap with that of another, especially when professionals are
permitted to practice to the full extent of their education, certification,
training, and experience. As a result of this overlap, different types of
providers may become—or be perceived as—competitors for the safe
and effective delivery of some health care services. General practice
physicians can encroach on specialists, advanced practice registered
nurses can encroach on physicians, or professionals licensed in one state
can remotely provide services to patients located elsewhere, intruding
upon the practices of local professionals.2 The ability to flexibly deploy
different types of practitioners to perform some of the same services, and
the competition this flexibility may engender, can make a valuable
calendar/2015/02/examining-health-care-competition [https://perma.cc/B64G-9ZQT] (last visited
Feb. 1, 2016) (providing workshop agendas, transcripts, and presentations).
2. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the broader potential “mismatch” between
existing regulations and modern health care delivery outside of the licensure context. Examples do,
however, abound. See, e.g., Karen A. Goldman et al., Panel Discussion: Innovations in Health Care
Delivery, in MARCH 20, 2014 WORKSHOP TRANSCRIPT: EXAMINING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION
67,
67–122
(2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/200361/
transcriptmar20.pdf [https://perma.cc/B64G-9ZQT] (discussing, inter alia, the extent to which
licensure and reimbursement regulations may affect telehealth innovation and deployment, and
whether certain regulatory restrictions may or may not be necessary to promote quality and
availability of care); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHRONIC CARE MANAGEMENT SERVICES (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-andEducation/Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/
ChronicCareManagement.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4S9-GA4T]
(explaining new Medicare
reimbursement mechanism for clinical staff time spent on non-face-to-face care coordination for
patients with multiple chronic conditions); Samuel T. Edwards & Bruce E. Landon, Medicare’s
Chronic Care Management Payment – Payment Reform for Primary Care, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED.
2049 (2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1410790 [https://perma.cc/64T97QBM] (describing new Medicare reimbursement policy and praising “investment in primary care
that may contribute to the development of a value-oriented health care system,” but also outlining
potential implementation challenges, including the risk that reimbursement methodology may not
alter financial incentives sufficiently to trigger practice transformations that would constrain costs
without sacrificing quality or access).

09 - Gavil Koslov.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/27/2016 3:15 PM

150

[Vol. 91:147

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

contribution to the system’s ability to achieve lower costs, expanded
access, and increased quality of care.3 It may also be one reason why
friction between various types of caregivers has persisted for a long time
and appears to be on the rise.4
Most health care service providers practice under varied,
longstanding, and pervasive regulatory regimes, primarily created at the
state level.5 Some of these regimes have roots in the origins of the
modern American medical system. They have developed over decades
and tend to reflect the educational systems, training regimens,
expectations, and mores of their times.6 Reflecting those times, these
regulations may entrench specific business and care delivery models,
creating what might be characterized as “regulatory barriers by design”
for some new types of providers.7 This may be especially true for those
who seek to provide the same services as incumbent providers do
through innovative practice or business models that do not readily fit
within established regulations. Further complicating the competitive
landscape, these regulations often are administered by self-interested,
nominally state boards constituted either of the very professionals to be

3. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., STEPHEN ISAACS & PAUL JELLINEK, PHYSICIANS’ FOUND., ACCEPT NO SUBSTITUTE:
A REPORT ON SCOPE OF PRACTICE 1 (2012), http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/
uploads/default/A_Report_on_Scope_of_Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4BP-P4X8]. In their
report, Isaacs and Jellinek note that
[o]ne of the most persistent and vexing challenges facing practicing physicians and the
organizations that represent them—and an issue with profound implications for health care in
this country—has been the growing demand by a broad array of non-physician providers for
state legislatures to expand their scope of practice into areas that until now have been restricted
to physicians. . . .
....
. . . [T]he pressure is relentless, driven by a range of underlying social, economic and political
forces.
Id.; cf. AM. ASS’N OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, ISSUES AT-A-GLANCE: FULL PRACTICE AUTHORITY
1
(2015),
https://www.aanp.org/images/documents/policy-toolbox/fullpracticeauthority.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2T2E-SSQU].
There is a disconnect between the higher level of care that nurse practitioners are prepared to
provide and the limited level of care that outdated state practice laws will allow them to deliver
to patients. Closing this gap between clinical preparation and regulated practice authority will
help end some of the obstacles that patients encounter when they seek health care.
Id.
5. See infra Section I.C.
6. Id.
7. See Andrew I. Gavil, The FTC’s Study and Advocacy Authority in Its Second Century: A Look
Ahead, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 1912 (2015) (“[B]ecause regulations tend to reflect the
features of the business models of a specific time period, they can favor incumbent firms over
challengers by entrenching a particular business method and insulating the firms that use it from
new sources of competition.”).
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regulated or their competitors. And those professionals may interpret
existing laws and regulations in ways that limit new sources of
competition, and may have both the means and incentive to extend these
protections through even more restrictive regulations.8
Existing regulations and regulatory systems, therefore, may not be
consonant with the expectations, capabilities, and needs of the changing
health care environment. To the contrary, these laws and regulations,
and the traditional way in which they have been administered, together
can erect hurdles in the path of competition and innovation. Instead of
being conducive to change, they can impede it in whole or in part, are
susceptible to manipulation, and invite efforts to impose new restrictions
to slow or arrest the development of new, expanded, and non-traditional
models of providing health care services. Some health care providers
thus have faced significant challenges when they seek to utilize their full
knowledge, training, and skills to provide safe and effective care.9 By
contrast, more flexible and forward-facing regulations could allow for
greater mobility in the health care work force, enabling caregivers to
respond to changes in demand in different regions, states, and locales.
By allowing for wider use of the full-range of expertise of all health care
service providers, such regulations could more effectively support care
delivery teams that are structured and deployed to best meet patient
needs.
This Article examines a classic regulatory dilemma that has surfaced
in the context of the health care professions: are certain features of the
current system of provider regulation a mismatch for the needs of a

8. In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101
(2015), the United States Supreme Court explained the problem as it relates to the scope of the
antitrust state action doctrine:
Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the State seeks to delegate its
regulatory power to active market participants, for established ethical standards may blend with
private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult even for market participants to discern. Dual
allegiances are not always apparent to an actor. In consequence, active market participants
cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets free from antitrust accountability.
Id. at 1111.
9. See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING, CHANGES IN HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONS’ SCOPE OF PRACTICE: LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
3
(2009),
https://www.ncsbn.org/ScopeofPractice_09.pdf [perma.cc/BL5R-74PN]. As the report notes,
[p]roposed changes to a healthcare professions’ scope of practice often elicit strongly worded
comments from several professional interest groups. Typically, these debates are perceived as
turf battles between two or more professions, with the common refrain of “this is part of my
practice so it can’t be part of yours.” Often lost among the competing arguments and assertions
are the most important issues of whether this proposed change will better protect the public and
enhance consumers’ access to competent healthcare services.
Id.
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changing health care marketplace?10 It concludes that if the goals of
lower cost, expanded access, and increased quality of care are to be
realized, some important features of these established regulatory
schemes will need to change. All providers of health care services
should be free to practice to the “top of their license”—that is, to the full
extent of their education, certification, and training.11 Given a broad
range of service providers, it is inevitable that there will be overlap in
the capabilities of professionals to provide some of the same services.
Some of these service providers, however, have been cordoned off into
distinct and restricted silos created by law and regulation—sometimes as
an unintended consequence, and sometimes deliberately and without
justification—thereby unnecessarily restricting competition.12 Although
licensure and related regulation can serve important public purposes,
competition considerations should be more fully integrated into the
process of deciding who should provide any specific service. The answer
to that question should not derive solely from historical regulatory
distinctions that cannot be justified today by legitimate safety or quality
concerns. Neither should it be influenced by the efforts of self-interested
professionals today, who seek to use the regulatory process to erect
additional barriers that impede new competitive challenges.13 The health
care work force of the early twenty-first century will need to be more
mobile, adaptable, innovative, and flexible, and it will need to be
governed by a regulatory philosophy and mechanisms that facilitate
those characteristics. In particular, standards for licensure ideally should
be more uniform across state lines, tied to functional skills and
qualifications rather than arbitrary categories, and determined via a
10. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191–96 (1982) (arguing that regulations
should be calibrated to “match” the perceived market defect they are intended to redress).
11. While this principle holds generally for all health care providers, the assertion often is
articulated with respect to nursing scope of practice, in particular. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCIS., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH (2011)
[hereinafter IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT], http://iom.nationalacademies.org/Reports/
2010/The-Future-of-Nursing-Leading-Change-Advancing-Health.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S9QUK89E]; id. at 4 (stating as one of four “key messages” that “[n]urses should practice to the full
extent of their education and training”); id. at 72–76 (“Care teams need to make the best use of each
member’s education, skill, and expertise, and all health professionals need to practice to the full
extent of their license and education.”); id. at 144 (“If the current conflicts between what nurses can
do based on their education and training and what they may do according to state and federal
policies and regulations are not addressed, patients will continue to experience limited access to
high-quality care.”).
12. See infra notes 28–41, 54–55 and accompanying text (providing examples of such
regulations).
13. See infra notes 125–29 and accompanying text (discussing accreditation standards for dental
therapy education programs).
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process that does not vest one type of professional with gatekeeping
power over another.
Part I sets out four basic assumptions about the role of health care
service providers in today’s health care marketplace. First, as the system
continues to evolve, many health care professionals’ training and
experience will overlap with others’, leading to increased competition
and consequent turf battles over the scope of practice. Second, demands
to harmonize the goals of cost containment, increased quality, and
enhanced value will continue to intensify. Third, given the tendency to
regulate healthcare professionals using “silos” carved out from the
practice of medicine and heavily influenced by competing professionals,
today’s regulatory approach is not well-suited to adaptations that will
unleash, rather than constrain, competition. And finally, the specific
characteristics of that current regulatory approach also generate
incentives, likely to grow, to use regulation to stifle rather than facilitate
competition.
Part II begins with an overview of three areas of antitrust law
enforcement that together provide a useful framework for evaluating
anticompetitive regulations in the health care sector: the law and
economics of exclusion, suppression of innovation, and the coordinated
conduct of professionals and their trade groups. This framework helps to
illuminate the economic mechanisms of regulatory exclusion that
characterize the most objectionable types of regulations. As is true of
exclusionary conduct that violates the antitrust laws, exclusion can occur
when laws or regulations impose additional and unjustified burdens and
costs on service providers thereby impeding new entry or expansion of
services without any related benefits for consumers. The result is harm
to competition, which can take the form of higher prices and lower
output of services, reduced quality, reduced service, or less innovation in
business and care delivery models.
In important ways, anticompetitive regulations in the health care
sector share common characteristics with private conduct that has been
challenged under the federal antitrust laws in these three areas. They can
also frustrate the goals of health care reform. To illustrate the
connection, Part II then surveys a sampling of specific regulations
affecting a range of regulated health care professions, some established
and others still emerging. Although regulations that protect legitimate
concerns for public health and safety are necessary, this sampling
demonstrates why decision-makers should more fully integrate a
competitive effects analysis into their deliberations to ensure that any
restrictions on competition are both warranted and, if so, no greater than
necessary to mitigate genuine health and safety risks.
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Part III begins by providing a guide for regulators, which builds on
the law, economics, and regulatory examples examined in Part II. It
explains how exclusionary regulations impose impediments to
competition that can range in their impact: from absolute barriers to
entry, to significant entry-deterring strategies, to mere annoyances that
can be overcome but still impose costs. We categorize the range of
exclusionary mechanisms to facilitate future recognition and
consideration of their likely competitive effects by lawmakers and
regulators. Part III also provides regulators with a set of useful questions
to answer that will assist them to identify and evaluate potentially
exclusionary regulations in the health care sector.
Part III concludes by challenging legislators, regulators, and health
care industry stakeholders alike to envision a different regulatory future,
in which competition principles better inform regulatory choices. It
outlines select principles that could help to identify reasonable, but more
conceptual and therefore more flexible, regulations for the modern
health care workforce. For example, as the health care system continues
to transition, legislators and regulators might consider moving beyond
static, profession- and credential-specific models for specifying how
each profession, as if in a silo, can safely go about providing services.
They could consider more generally expressed performance, quality, and
ethical benchmarks, which might work in lieu of or in tandem with more
traditional specifications of the range of services that each provider can
deliver safely and effectively. They might increasingly consider using
regional or national compacts that would generalize standards beyond
state boundaries. They might also consider how best to administer their
regulatory systems to make them less prone to local capture by selfinterested professionals who participate in the markets to be regulated.
I.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ROLE OF HEALTH CARE
SERVICE PROVIDERS IN TODAY’S HEALTH CARE
MARKETPLACE

In this Part, the Article distills a few underlying assumptions about
the current state of the health care industry and its likely near-term
direction, particularly with respect to the role of health care service
providers. These baseline assumptions provide context for the
subsequent analysis of the regulation of health occupations.
Nearly all health policy discussions today flow from the so-called
“triple aim” of health care reform, the original formulation of which
includes three dimensions: “[i]mproving the [individual] patient
experience of care (including quality and satisfaction); [i]mproving the
health of populations; and [r]educing the per capita cost of health

09 - Gavil Koslov.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/27/2016 3:15 PM

PROMOTING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION

155

care.”14 To achieve the triple aim, all of the institutional players in the
health care industry must pursue strategies that will harness the benefits
of competition. These strategies will necessarily include an examination
of the role of health care professionals and a concerted effort to adapt
long-standing regulatory approaches to the changing needs of the
industry.
A.

Increased Overlap of Service Capabilities Will Lead to Greater
Competition Between Health Care Professionals

To maximize the efficiency of the health care system and ensure
adequate access to quality care, all providers of health care services must
be allowed and encouraged to practice to the top of their license,
utilizing the full extent of their training, skills, and experience to provide
safe and effective care. As the health care workforce evolves to fulfill
that promise, however, it is inevitable that the services performed by
different types of health care providers will increasingly overlap. In
market terms, providers will compete to provide services that fall within
the competency of more than one profession. For example, the skills of
physicians and nurses can overlap somewhat, especially in primary care
settings.15 Although these two types of professionals are not broad
substitutes for each other and their skill sets are largely complementary,
as is depicted in Figure 1, the two sets of services do intersect, which

14. The IHI Triple Aim, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, http://www.ihi.org/engage
/initiatives/tripleaim/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/EN5X-M39G] (last visited Feb. 3, 2016);
Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759 (2008).
While the Institute for Healthcare Improvement developed the initial framework, the triple aim
terminology and concept have been widely adopted in health policy circles, in no small part because
implementation of the triple aim goals was Dr. Berwick’s self-professed “main focus” during his
tenure as Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from July 2010
through December 2011. See, e.g., Chris Fleming, Berwick Brings the “Triple Aim” to CMS,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/09/14/berwick-brings-thetriple-aim-to-cms/ [https://perma.cc/QNF4-2FSA]. The triple aim is closely aligned with, but not
identical to, the earlier concept of the health care “iron triangle” of access, quality, and cost
containment. See WILLIAM L. KISSICK, MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE
RESOURCES 2 (1994) (“[A]ccess, quality, and cost containment have equal angles, representing
identical priorities, and an expansion of any one angle compromises one or both of the other two.”).
15. See, e.g., Health Policy Briefs, Nurse Practitioners and Primary Care (Updated), HEALTH
AFF. (May 15, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=92
[https://perma.cc/8Q8W-QBY5] (“Primary care comprises a broad range of services, including the
initial evaluation of new symptoms, ongoing care for chronic diseases, and preventive services such
as immunizations or screenings. . . . Primary care services can be provided by physicians and by a
range of nonphysician practitioners, such as physician assistants [“PAs”] and nurse practitioners
[“NPs”], both of whom have graduate degrees and are authorized to examine, diagnose, and treat
patients.”).
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means there are a substantial number of services for which physicians
and nurses could be practical and economic substitutes.16
Figure 1: Opportunities for Competition
Services that may be provided safely
and effectively by physicians or nurses:
•

Take and interpret health histories

•

Conduct physical exams

•

Diagnose, treat, and prescribe medications for
common acute illnesses

•

Diagnose and treat common acute injuries
and wounds

•

Manage chronic conditions, such as high
blood pressure and diabetes

•

Order and interpret X-rays and other
laboratory tests

•

Counsel patients on health maintenance and
disease prevention

•

Provide referrals to other health care
providers, as needed

Services typically
provided by
physicians

Services typically
provided by nurses

16. The lists of services offered by so-called “retail clinics” run by major pharmacy chains, such
as CVS and Walgreens, provide a useful real-world example of the breadth of overlap as determined
by firms that sell primary care services. These clinics typically are staffed by NPs or, occasionally,
PAs. See, e.g., Services, CVS MINUTE CLINIC, http://www.cvs.com/minuteclinic/services
[https://perma.cc/QA97-VVK9] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016); Our Services, WALGREENS HEALTH
CLINIC,
http://www.walgreens.com/topic/pharmacy/healthcare-clinic/our-services.jsp
[https://perma.cc/56MH-LYTK] (last visited Feb. 29, 2016); see also AM. NURSES ASS’N,
ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING: A NEW AGE IN HEALTH CARE 2 (2011),
http://www.nursingworld.org/FunctionalMenuCategories/MediaResources/MediaBackgrounders/A
PRN-A-New-Age-in-Health-Care.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYC3-DCLA] (“NPs take health histories;
conduct physical exams; diagnose and treat common acute illnesses and injuries; give
immunizations; manage high blood pressure, diabetes, and other chronic conditions; order and
interpret X-rays and other laboratory tests; counsel patients on disease prevention and healthy
lifestyles; and refer patients to other health providers as needed.”). See generally NAT’L
GOVERNORS ASS’N, NGA PAPER: THE ROLE OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS IN MEETING INCREASING
DEMAND
FOR
PRIMARY
CARE
(2012)
[hereinafter
NGA
NP
PAPER],
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1212NursePractitionersPaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7UKA-KRTS] (drawing conclusions based on literature review of empirical work
and meta-analyses regarding NP performance). As the NGA NP Paper concludes,
[r]esearch suggests that NPs can perform many primary care services as well as physicians do
and achieve equal or higher patient satisfaction rates among their patients . . . . None of the
studies in NGA’s literature review raise concerns about the quality of care offered by NPs.
Most studies showed that NP-provided care is comparable to physician-provided care on
several process and outcome measures. Moreover, the studies suggest that NPs may provide
improved access to care.
Id. at 7–8. Although this Article focuses primarily on overlaps between physicians and nurses, it is
useful to recognize that overlaps occur in other contexts as well, such as between primary care
physicians and specialists, or between hospital-based and office-based practitioners.
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Similar diagrams could be drawn to depict other examples of likely
service overlap, where the overlap represents opportunities for
competition.
Moreover, as hospitals increasingly serve as focal points for
comprehensive health care systems—whether through some degree of
vertical integration, contractual affiliations, or other alliances—they are
paying closer attention to the relative efficiency and quality of care
delivered in outpatient care delivery settings beyond the hospital itself.17
This trend may create an additional dimension of competition between
health systems as they seek to maximize profits across the entire
continuum of inpatient and outpatient care by, for example: acquiring or
partnering with local physicians in outpatient primary care and specialty
practices; competing to build loyalty among patients, who may perceive
benefits from centralizing their outpatient care within a particular
system; and incentivizing physicians to drive inpatient referrals to the
system’s hospital facilities.18 This type of integration is also likely to
exacerbate existing tensions between different types of health care
17. In a vertically-integrated hospital system, the quality and efficiency of care outside the
hospital obviously contribute to the system’s financial bottom line. This is even more true if health
care services are reimbursed under a bundled payment methodology. See, e.g., Comprehensive Care
for Joint Replacement Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/cjr [https://perma.cc/2H7N-7HN6] (last updated Jan. 29,
2016). Under the new Medicare program, certain hospitals will be held accountable for an entire
“episode of care” for a hip or knee replacement, including almost all related items and outpatient
services that normally would be covered by Medicare, beginning at hospital admission and ending
ninety days after discharge. Id. In addition, under changes to Medicare that were first implemented
in 2012 and have been refined annually, most hospitals now face an explicit financial penalty for
“excess” readmissions (defined according to specific criteria), which may be affected by the level of
communication with outpatient providers upon discharge, as well as the amount and quality of postdischarge care. See Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.150–.154 (2016)
(implementing the readmissions penalty program created by the Affordable Care Act);
Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-payment/acuteinpatientpps/readmissionsreduction-program.html [https://perma.cc/8ER2-4RBR] (last updated Feb. 4, 2016).
18. See, e.g., BERKELEY FORUM FOR IMPROVING CALIFORNIA’S HEALTHCARE DELIVERY SYS., A
NEW VISION FOR CALIFORNIA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: INTEGRATED CARE WITH ALIGNED
FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES
38
(2013),
http://berkeleyhealthcareforum.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/A-New-Vision-for-California%E2%80%99s-Healthcare-System.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TSH-K7EG] (suggesting that, while greater employment of physicians by
hospitals may improve clinical integration and care coordination, it may also raise costs, because
care provided at hospitals may be reimbursed at higher rates, and also because “physicians may be
influenced by hospitals to order more expensive care or increase referrals and admissions”); Saint
Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., Nos. 12-CV-00560-BLW, 13CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *13 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir.
2015) (discussing typical referral practice patterns that result from integration in the context of an
analysis of the potential anticompetitive effects of a hospital system’s acquisition of a large
multispecialty physician group).
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providers as traditional office-based, physician-led practices face new
financial pressures from affiliated systems looking to contain overall
costs.19
B.

Demands to Harmonize Cost, Quality, and Value Will Continue to
Intensify

Another common triple aim theme is greater emphasis on value,
which explicitly recognizes the relationship between quality and cost,
and also prioritizes outcomes over procedures.20 Several major health
care reform efforts seek to promote value over volume by fine-tuning
reimbursement methodologies to disincentivize unnecessary,
duplicative, or otherwise low-value services that do not appear to
promote better health outcomes. Some of these new payment models
also seek to harness the power of competition by explicitly rewarding
value-based care and better outcomes.21 In response, existing care

19. The services provided by hospitals and hospital-based health care professionals, for example,
are increasingly overlapping with the services provided by freestanding physician practice groups.
This was a phenomenon explored by the FTC and the Ninth Circuit in Saint Alphonsus Medical
Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015), in which the
FTC and the State of Idaho successfully challenged the acquisition by a hospital of a physician
practice group because it would substantially reduce competition.
20. See generally Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2477
(2010).
Achieving high value for patients must become the overarching goal of health care delivery,
with value defined as the health outcomes achieved per dollar spent.
....
. . . Since value depends on results, not inputs, value in health care is measured by the
outcomes achieved, not the volume of services delivered, and shifting focus from volume to
value is a central challenge. Nor is value measured by the process of care used; process
measurement and improvement are important tactics but are no substitutes for measuring
outcomes and costs.
Id. at 2477.
21. For example, the CMS Innovation Center has launched a number of Accountable Care
Organization (ACO) and related demonstration models designed to reimburse services provided to
Medicare beneficiaries differently than the traditional fee-for-service approach. The Medicare
Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACO model encourages providers to form groups that will
coordinate care for a defined group of patients in a variety of settings, incentivized in part by the
promise of bonus payments (on top of traditional fee-for-service payments) if the ACO’s provider
members meet or exceed certain quality standards and cost savings for those patients. See generally
Shared Savings Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/
Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/index.html [https://perma.cc/
7GD3-5TFJ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016). Taking this approach one step further, the Pioneer ACO
model offers participating providers not only the carrot of shared savings, but also the stick of
having to pay back CMS for shared losses if the ACO fails to meet certain quality and cost targets.
See generally Pioneer ACO Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/Pioneer-ACO-Model/ [https://perma.cc/HJ2P-2YXK] (last
visited Feb 4, 2016). The CMS Innovation Center continues to develop additional models that will
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delivery models are evolving and new models are emerging, relying on
greater collaboration, coordination, and financial interdependence
among various types of health care providers according to a flexible,
team-based approach.22 Ideally, responsibilities would be allocated
functionally—based on which type of professional is available,
qualified, and able to deliver the best value. From the perspective of
some health care professionals, however, this challenges the traditional
hierarchical structure of medicine, whereby supervising physicians
typically make decisions and issue orders to authorize the actions of
other members of the care delivery team whose autonomy is limited.23

shift provider reimbursement methodologies from volume to value. See, e.g., Next Generation ACO
Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/NextGeneration-ACO-Model/ [https://perma.cc/X4LS-2HMW] (last visited Feb. 4, 2016);
Comprehensive ESRD Care Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/comprehensive-ESRD-care/ [https://perma.cc/K7JW-APM8]
(last visited Feb. 4, 2016) (providing information regarding an accountable care model to cover
Medicare patients undergoing treatment for End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD)). See generally
Innovation
Models,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
&
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/index.html#views=models [https://perma.cc/Q4YM-DUQE]
(last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
22. See generally Atul Gawande, Cowboys and Pit Crews, NEW YORKER (May 26, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/cowboys-and-pit-crews
[https://perma.cc/W7JJSYNM] (Harvard Medical School commencement address arguing, inter alia, that medicine has
become so complex that the lone “cowboy” model of practice no longer works; rather, a
coordinated, team-based, “pit crew” approach is required, including realignment of financial
incentives; “[w]e have every indication . . . that where people in medicine combine their talents and
efforts to design organized service to patients and local communities, extraordinary change can
result”).
The Next Generation ACO Model, while limited to the Medicare context, is a good example of
how this vision might be realized more broadly throughout the U.S. health care system. Next
Generation Medicare ACOs—comprising hospitals, physicians, nurses, and various other health
care providers and suppliers—will receive financial incentives to enhance coordination among team
members and achieve high-quality care, while reducing costs and improving the overall patient
experience. Next Generation ACO Model, supra note 21. Target participating providers are
experienced in coordinating care and willing to assume greater financial risk, in return for the
promise of greater rewards if they meet financial and clinical outcome goals. The program will
supply ACO participating providers with additional tools to support coordinated care management
and patient engagement by the entire provider team. Id.; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., NEXT GENERATION ACO MODEL: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2015),
https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/nextgenacofaq.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJX4-6F3E] (“‘[B]enefit
enhancement’ tools to help ACOs improve engagement with beneficiaries” will include “greater
access to home visits, telehealth services, and skilled nursing facility services.”).
23. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ASSESSING PROGRESS ON THE INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE REPORT THE FUTURE OF NURSING 2–9 (2015), http://download.nap.edu/
cart/download.cgi?&record_id=21838 [https://perma.cc/Y5VN-PZCC] (prepublication copy,
uncorrected proofs) (discussing transformation to value-based care, triple aim goals, and greater
emphasis on collaboration among different types of providers, within context of report section
advocating generally for expanded scope of practice for nurses).
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C.

The Current Regulatory Framework Will Prove Increasingly
Incapable of Adapting to Changes in the Industry

These developments and trends highlight the deficiencies of the U.S.
system of regulation for health care professionals, which is not well
suited to attain the triple aim goals. It neither encourages appropriate
competition among different types of qualified health care providers, nor
supports an increasingly collaborative environment based on crossfunctional provider teams whose members practice to the full extent of
their training and competence. Rather, the traditional approach to health
care professional licensure tends to create “silos” that promote and
sustain counterproductive turf battles between different types of health
care providers, especially physicians and nurses.24 In competition policy
terms, these kinds of regulations establish a division of service markets
that, if achieved through private conduct, would be likely condemned as
unlawful.25
Physicians in the United States are licensed by individual states,
pursuant to very broad and general definitions of the practice of
medicine.26 Although specialists and subspecialists receive additional
training and certification compared to general practitioners, state
practice laws typically confer a broad license to practice medicine and
surgery on all physicians in a given state.27
24. See infra notes 28–41.
25. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (holding that an agreement by rivals
to divide markets and customers was a per se violation of the antitrust laws).
26. For a representative example, see section 18.71.011 of the Revised Code of Washington:
A person is practicing medicine if he does one or more of the following:
(1) Offers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise or prescribe for any human disease,
ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or
imaginary, by any means or instrumentality;
(2) Administers or prescribes drugs or medicinal preparations to be used by any other
person;
(3) Severs or penetrates the tissues of human beings;
(4) Uses on cards, books, papers, signs or other written or printed means of giving
information to the public, in the conduct of any occupation or profession pertaining to
the diagnosis or treatment of human disease or conditions the designation “doctor of
medicine”, “physician”, “surgeon”, “m.d.” or any combination thereof unless such
designation additionally contains the description of another branch of the healing arts
for which a person has a license . . . .
WASH. REV. CODE § 18.71.011 (2016).
27. “By the early 20th century, each state had adopted a so-called ‘medical practice act’ that
essentially claimed the entire human condition as the exclusive province of medicine. The statutory
definitions of physicians’ scope of practice were—and remain—extremely broad.” Barbara J.
Safriet, Federal Options for Maximizing the Value of Advanced Practice Nurses in Providing
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In stark contrast, almost every other health profession, including
nursing, is regulated pursuant to a licensure scheme based on “carveouts” from the practice of medicine.28 The licensure laws and regulations
typically define a rigid “scope of practice” based on permission to
perform an enumerated set of procedures and services.29 For example, if
a service is not specifically listed as within the scope of practice for an
Advanced Practice Registered Nurse (APRN) in a given state, an APRN
in that state is not authorized to perform the service, even if her training
and experience would enable her to do so safely and effectively.30 This
Quality, Cost-Effective Health Care, in IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 11, at 443,
451 app. H. In theory—and setting aside important ethical and liability issues—a general
practitioner could perform neurosurgery without violating the scope of a state-granted license to
practice medicine.
28. See, e.g., Safriet, supra note 27, at 452 (“[T]he real mischief was accomplished through
corresponding provisions making it illegal for anyone not licensed as a physician to undertake any
of the acts included in the definition.”); id. at 450 (“[T]he scopes of practice for [advanced practice
nurses] (and other health professionals) are exercises in legislative exception making a ‘carving out’
of small, politically achievable spheres of practice authority from the universal domain of
medicine.”); see also NGA NP PAPER, supra note 16, at 3 (“State medical laws originated by
defining the practice of medicine expansively and restricting such activities to licensed physicians.
Subsequent efforts to alter scope of practice laws to account for other developing health professions
have taken the form of ‘carving out’ services that non-physician providers could perform.”).
29. See, for example, Washington Administrative Code sections 246-840-300 to -455, for a
comprehensive set of regulations (beyond the state’s nursing licensure statute) that spell out
precisely what an advanced registered nurse practitioner (ARNP) in the State of Washington is
allowed to do. Conversely, an ARNP would run the risk of being accused of the unlawful practice of
medicine if he or she performed any service not specifically enumerated in these regulations. Even
in Washington—a state with broad practice authority for advanced practice nurses—the initial
regulatory section defining an ARNP’s basic scope of practice is detailed.
Under subsection 246-840-300(6) of the Washington Administrative Code:
Performing within the scope of the ARNP’s knowledge, experience and practice, the licensed
ARNP may perform the following:
(a) Examine patients and establish diagnoses by patient history, physical examination and
other methods of assessment;
(b) Admit, manage and discharge patients to and from health care facilities;
(c) Order, collect, perform and interpret diagnostic tests;
(d) Manage health care by identifying, developing, implementing and evaluating a plan of
care and treatment for patients;
(e) Prescribe therapies and medical equipment;
(f) Prescribe medications when granted authority under this chapter;
(g) Refer patients to other health care practitioners, services or facilities; and
(h) Perform procedures or provide care services that are within the scope of practice
according to the commission approved certification program.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-840-300(6) (2016).
30. A common example is prescriptive authority. For example, consider the case of an APRN
who has practiced for many years in a state like Wyoming, where licensed APRNs are authorized to
independently write a wide range of prescriptions, including antibiotics to treat basic infections.
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regulatory approach likely does not provide sufficient flexibility to
enable the APRN to practice to the top of her license. The siloed
licensure classifications based on discrete occupation names and
regulatory code sections, rather than actual education, training, and
skills, also tend to mask the fact that the APRN could compete directly
with physicians to perform certain services safely and effectively.31
In addition, the siloed system stifles adaptation when—as often
happens in medicine—specialized aspects of treatment gradually
become routine. When an innovative procedure or therapy is first
introduced, it may be performed or prescribed only by highly specialized
physicians. As the treatment becomes more common and routine, it may
be incorporated into basic medical training and experience, such that
general practitioners may become competent to provide it. An example
might be the reading of x-rays, which all physicians are trained to do.
When presented with a suspected broken arm, a general practitioner in
an urgent care clinic or emergency room could and would review an xray in the first instance and make an initial diagnosis, even if a
specialized radiologist might later review the image to confirm. Because
physicians practice under a broad license, with full discretion to
determine the appropriate standard of care as it relates to their own
capabilities, if a general practitioner determined she possessed adequate
skills to read such an x-ray, she already would be automatically licensed
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-21-120 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.) (defining APRN to
include a nurse who “[m]ay prescribe, administer, dispense or provide nonprescriptive and
prescriptive medications”); see also 024-054-003 WYO. CODE R. § 2 (LexisNexis 2016) (governing
“Scope and Standards of Nursing Practice for the APRN”); id. § 2(b) (governing “Prescriptive
Authority”). Suppose that, over the years, the APRN has appropriately written thousands of
prescriptions for antibiotics for routine ear infections, sinus infections, urinary tract infections, and
the like. If the same APRN moved to Texas and obtained licensure there, he would no longer have
any prescribing authority, unless he demonstrated advanced pharmacotherapeutics education,
applied separately for prescriptive authority (beyond his licensure application), applied separately
for prescribing authority for each population focus (e.g., children, women, etc.), and obtained and
filed with the Texas Medical Board a written delegation of prescriptive authority from a specific
supervising physician. See 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222.1–.10 (2016) (governing “Advanced
Practice Registered Nurses with Prescriptive Authority”); id. § 222.4 (governing “Minimum
Standards for Prescribing or Ordering Drugs and Devices”).
31. See Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Economic Effects of Licensing Health Care
Professions, 28 ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Apr. 2015, at 29, 30 (describing that the
medical profession controls licensure by defining the practice of medicine broadly, which denies
consumers the ability to substitute the services of lower-cost providers); Jennifer Perloff et al.,
Comparing the Cost of Care Provided to Medicare Beneficiaries Assigned to Primary Care Nurse
Practitioners
and
Physicians,
70
HEALTH
SERVS.
RES.
(2015),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1475-6773.12425/epdf [https://perma.cc/4MLH-Y929]
(concluding that cost of care for Medicare beneficiaries managed by nurse practitioners was lower
compared to those managed by primary care physicians).

09 - Gavil Koslov.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

PROMOTING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION

3/27/2016 3:15 PM

163

to provide that service. In contrast, even when a service or treatment
becomes routine and is incorporated into APRN training and experience,
such that APRNs are competent to provide it independently, static
scope-of-practice carve-outs for nurses may prevent APRNs from
providing the service. APRNs—unlike physicians—likely would need to
seek specific legislative or regulatory changes, to expand their legal
scope of practice to match their capabilities.32

32. The evolution of Georgia’s APRN supervision requirements provides a stark example. Under
the state’s 1989 nurse protocol statute, Georgia APRNs were able to order radiographic imaging
tests when such authority had been delegated by a supervising physician. Professions and
Business—Physician’s Assistants; Nurses; Authority to Order or Dispense Drugs, Medical
Treatments, or Diagnostic Studies, § 3, 1989 GA. LAWS 261, 261. Georgia APRNs lost most of their
authority to order these tests—even if a physician is willing to delegate such authority—when, in
2006, a revised statute provided that APRNs cannot order radiographic imaging except in a “life
threatening” situation. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-25 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). For
an account of these changes, see James F. Lawrence, Key Legislative Points Impacting APRNs in
Georgia: A History of Important Legislation of APRNs in Georgia, UNITED ADVANCED PRACTICE
REGISTERED NURSES GA., https://uaprn.enpnetwork.com/page/17851-key-legislative-pointsimpacting-aprns-in-georgia [https://perma.cc/X6QY-VYHY] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016).
Restoration of the authority routinely delegated to APRNs between 1989 and 2006 would require
amendments to the statute, but proposed legislative fixes have failed. See, e.g., S. 386, 151st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012). This limitation is particularly troublesome in Georgia, a state with
a significant population of low income and rural patients who may be disproportionately affected by
a lack of access to care, and who may suffer from unnecessary delays in diagnosis and treatment if
APRNs cannot independently order such tests. For additional background on Georgia’s physician
shortage and the evolution of APRN regulation in Georgia, including its regulation of APRN
prescriptive authority, see BETH STEPHENS, GA. WATCH, PERSPECTIVES ON ADVANCED PRACTICE
REGISTERED
NURSING
IN
GEORGIA
(2015),
http://www.georgiawatch.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/01/APRN01072015WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RCQ-R9XB]. The report
describes Georgia’s APRN practice laws as “some of [the] most restrictive in the nation.” Id. at 1.
Anesthesia care provides another good example of how APRN skills and expertise may expand
over time, creating a challenge when laws and regulations do not keep pace. Certified Registered
Nurse Anesthetists (CRNAs) are a specialized type of APRN trained to provide various types of
anesthesia services. While their scope of practice differs from state to state, over time the
independent practice authority of CRNAs has expanded in many states, such that they can provide
services ranging from in-hospital anesthesia for surgery, to epidurals for labor and delivery, to
outpatient interventional pain management services for chronic pain. See, e.g., IOM FUTURE OF
NURSING REPORT, supra note 11, at 111 (“[E]vidence shows that CRNAs provide high-quality care
[and] there is no evidence of patient harm from their practice . . . . A study by Dulisse and Cromwell
(2010) found no increase in inpatient mortality or complications in states that [do not require] that
an anesthesiologist or surgeon oversee the administration of anesthesia by a CRNA.” (citing Brian
Dulisse & Jerry Cromwell, No Harm Found When Nurse Anesthetists Work Without Supervision by
Physicians, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1469 (2010))); INST. OF MED., COMM. ON ADVANCING PAIN RES.,
CARE, & EDUC., RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING PREVENTION,
CARE, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 11 (2011), http://www.nap.edu/read/13172/chapter/1
[https://perma.cc/TNY5-F9DC] (recommending an increase in the number of health professionals
with advanced expertise in pain care). See generally id.; About CRNAs, AM. ASS’N NURSE
ANESTHETISTS,
http://www.aana.com/aboutus/value-of-crnas/Pages/Facts-About-CRNAs.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YRD3-6ME9] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
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These problems are exacerbated by the state-by-state nature of
occupational licensure, which affects health care providers as it does
virtually all licensed professionals.33 An experienced APRN may have
worked for many years in a state with relatively broad scope of practice
rules; she then moves to another state where she is not be authorized to
provide comparable services without meeting additional requirements.34
In particular, an APRN who may have been licensed, and practiced
safely and effectively for years in a state that permits “independent”
practice (subject to the APRN’s own judgment regarding consultations
and referrals), who then moves to a state where every APRN is required
to have a written physician supervision agreement, may find her ability
to practice independently severely curtailed.35 As Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) staff explained in a 2014 policy paper, Policy
Perspectives: Competition and the Regulation of Advanced Practice
Nurses,36 discussed in greater detail below,37 such physician supervision
requirements are likely to deny consumers the benefits of competition,
reduce access to care, and inhibit innovation in the development of new
models of health care delivery.38
In addition, regulatory silos may suppress innovation to develop new
types of providers, including the kinds of innovation that may foster
experimentation and comparisons across states. First, if a new approach
to care delivery does not fit neatly into an existing silo, it may be barred
33. For a recent, broad survey of the expansion and competitive consequences of state licensure
of professions and trades, see Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014). See also MORRIS
M. KLEINER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING POLICIES (2015),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/reform_occupational_licensing_policies
_kleiner_v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV6G-5LB7] (asserting that state-based occupational licensing
systems unduly restrict competition and therefore should be reformed).
34. See, e.g., supra note 30 (discussing state-by-state differences in prescriptive authority).
35. The American Association of Nurse Practitioners (AANP) maintains a database that
categorizes each state’s nursing regulations as allowing “full,” “reduced,” or “restricted” practice,
along with links to each state’s nursing practice act and related laws and regulations. State Practice
Environment, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC., https://www.aanp.org/legislation-regulation/statelegislation/state-practice-environment [https://perma.cc/F6HA-RR2D] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016)
[hereinafter AANP State Practice Environment Data]. Requirements for so-called “collaborative
practice agreements,” which impose mandatory physician supervision, are the main determinative
factor for the state-by-state categorizations.
36. FED. TRADE COMM’N STAFF, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF
ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_
documents/policy-perspectives-competition-regulation-advanced-practice-nurses/140307
aprnpolicypaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/W36H-H2RN] [hereinafter FTC APRN POLICY PAPER].
37. See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
38. See generally infra Section II.B (discussing regulations that may impede competition among
health care professionals).
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entirely until it secures some kind of statutory or regulatory approval,
which can take years. Second, if regulators are receptive to permitting it,
a typical approach will be to create a whole new silo rather than to adapt
current regulations, thus exacerbating the sense of “separateness” among
professionals and adding potentially needless regulatory complexity.
Both approaches de-emphasize the potential for, and the perception, of
competition. The recent and ongoing development of the dental therapy
profession, discussed in greater detail below,39 is an excellent example.
Dental therapists fall somewhere between dentists and dental hygienists:
they typically have more training than licensed hygienists, and are
specifically trained to provide some dental services traditionally
provided only by licensed dentists.40 The profession is so new that only a
few states have established or proposed licensure pathways and scope of
practice definitions for dental therapists. All have created entirely new
regulatory silos that would contain dental therapists and separate them
from other dental professions.41
Finally, two other important trends will stress the regulatory model
for health care professionals: increasing demand and stagnant or slowly
increasing supply, which together produce a shortage. Demand for
health care services continues to climb, not only due to an aging
population, but also because of the growing number of people and
families who now have health care insurance.42 Many geographic areas
39. See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
40. “A dental therapist is a licensed oral health professional who practices as part of the dental
team to provide educational, clinical and therapeutic patient services. Dental therapists provide
basic preventive and restorative treatment to children and adults, and extractions of primary (baby)
teeth under the supervision of a dentist.” Dental Therapy – A New Profession, U. MINN. SCH.
DENTISTRY,
http://dentistry.umn.edu/programs-admissions/dental-therapy/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/7SWQ-DAZQ] (last updated Dec. 16, 2015). The University of Minnesota was
one of the first schools to offer a dental therapy curriculum, and Minnesota was the first state to
establish licensure of dental therapists. Id.
41. For an overview of states where dental therapist licensure has been established or
contemplated, see Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Sherin Tooks, Dir., Comm’n on Dental
Accreditation 3–4 (Dec. 2, 2013) [hereinafter FTC 2013 CODA Comment],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-commentcommission-dental-accreditation-concerning-proposed-accreditation-standards-dental/
131204codacomment.pdf [https://perma.cc/9USU-ETHV] (providing an overview of the Minnesota
program); id. at 5 nn.34–37 and accompanying text (surveying other states where legislation has
been introduced); see also id. at 4 n.21 (describing Alaska’s federally mandated Dental Health Aide
Therapist program for Alaska Native Americans).
42. See, e.g., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PROJECTING THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PRIMARY CARE PRACTITIONERS THROUGH 2020, at 1
(2013),
http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/supplydemand/usworkforce/primarycare/
projectingprimarycare.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK2L-9C5R] (“Demand for primary care services is
projected to increase through 2020, due largely to aging and population growth and, to a much
lesser extent, the expanded insurance coverage implemented under the Affordable Care Act . . . .”);

09 - Gavil Koslov.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/27/2016 3:15 PM

166

[Vol. 91:147

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

in the United States already are plagued by poor or inconsistent access to
care,43 and provider shortages are predicted to worsen in the coming
years.44 Current regulatory silos and inflexible scope-of-practice
restrictions exacerbate provider shortages by making it more difficult to
match the supply of skilled health care providers with patients in need of
care.
D.

Incentives to Use Regulation to Stifle Competition Will Increase

Whether in health care or in other areas of the economy,
anticompetitive regulation is more likely to arise in markets that share
certain common characteristics. These characteristics tend to make such
markets more conducive to anticompetitive regulation, and thus increase
the probability that incumbent suppliers will have the incentive to
advocate for new or continued restrictive regulation.45 They include: (1)
extensive regulation, often at the state or local level; (2) regulations that
tend to reflect a dominant, “legacy” business model; (3) changing
market conditions; (4) the emergence of new products, services, or
business models that are incompatible with the existing regulatory
IHS INC., THE COMPLEXITIES OF PHYSICIAN SUPPLY AND DEMAND: PROJECTIONS FROM 2013 TO
2025
(2015), https://www.aamc.org/download/426242/data/ihsreportdownload.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BK4A-P4SV] (“Study results suggest the demand for physician services is growing faster
than supply. While growth in the supply of APRNs and other health occupations may help to
alleviate projected shortfalls to an extent, even taking into consideration potential changes in
staffing, the nation will likely face a growing shortage in many physician specialties . . . .”).
43. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) designates Health Professional
Shortage Areas (HPSAs) for certain geographies or populations, using a variety of criteria.
According to HRSA’s most recent data, the United States has over 6000 designated primary care
HPSAs, over 5000 dental health HPSAs, and over 4000 mental health HPSAs (located in every
state).
Shortage
Areas,
U.S.
DEP’T
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERVS.,
HRSA,
http://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/topics/shortageAreas.aspx#chart [https://perma.cc/6PA9-B5J5] (last
visited Feb. 5, 2015) (interactive charts based on real-time data). HRSA also designates Medically
Underserved Areas/Populations (MUA/Ps), of which there are currently over 4000 (again, in every
state). HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICALLY
UNDERSERVED AREAS/POPULATIONS (MUA/P) STATE SUMMARY OF DESIGNATED MUA/P,
http://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/tools/hdwreports/Reports.aspx#
[https://perma.cc/3BWG-SJSG]
(click on “Shortage Areas, Medically Underserved Areas/Populations (MUA/P),” then “State
Summary” to generate report based on real-time data).
44. Shortages of dental providers are, and will continue to be, particularly acute. See, e.g., Jane
Koppelman, Access to Care Could Worsen as Dentist Shortages Intensify, PEW CHARITABLE TR.
(Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/09/21/
access-to-care-could-worsen-as-dentist-shortages-intensify
[https://perma.cc/B9EQ-ER96];
BUREAU OF HEALTH WORKFORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL AND
STATE-LEVEL PROJECTIONS OF DENTISTS AND DENTAL HYGIENISTS IN THE U.S., 2012–2025
(2015), http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/healthworkforce/supplydemand/dentistry/nationalstatelevelprojections
dentists.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G5C-K3R7].
45. For a discussion of examples from various industries, see Gavil, supra note 7, at 1911–17.
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framework; and (5) a consequent increase in the incentives for
incumbents to use the regulatory process to impede new market entrants.
These characteristics are evident today in markets as varied as electrical
power distribution46 and automobile sales.47 They have also given rise to
near warfare in sectors of the sharing economy, 48 taxi and related
transportation services,49 and municipal broadband,50 where incumbents
46. FTC staff have long been vocal in promoting regulatory reforms to promote competition in
the provision of electrical power. For a recent example, see Reply Comment of the Staff of the Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy
Vision (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffreply-comment-state-new-york-public-service-commission-reforming-energy-visionproceeding/112315nypsc.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FXK-JMV5]. Regulatory barriers may also be
inhibiting the adoption of renewable energy sources. See, e.g., Renewable Energy, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY,
http://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/topics/renewable.html
[https://perma.cc/U87Y-JFHM] (last updated July 8, 2015) (discussing “Barriers to Renewable
Energy”).
47. The sale and service of automobiles is extensively regulated by the states, many of which
prohibit the direct sale of automobiles to consumers by manufacturers. The effect is to mandate that
all consumer purchases be made through independent dealers, which stifles innovation in
automobile distribution, such as direct-to-consumer internet-based sales. FTC staff has encouraged
state legislators to eliminate such limitations on competition, which have been vigorously defended
by automobile dealers and their trade associations. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff
to Darwin L. Boorher, Senator, Mich. State Senate (May 7, 2015) [hereinafter FTC Letter to Darwin
L. Boorher], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-commentregarding-michigan-senate-bill-268-which-would-create-limited-exceptioncurrent/150511michiganautocycle.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XM3-T9WV]. A workshop was also held
on January 19, 2016, to explore these and broader issues related to the reform of state automobile
regulations to adapt to new automotive technologies and innovation in distribution methods. See
Auto
Distribution:
Current
Issues
and
Trends,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2016/01/auto-distribution-current-issues-futuretrends [https://perma.cc/7WFE-MMND] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). For a description of the issues to
be addressed at the workshop, see Tara Isa Koslov & James Frost, The FTC Opens the Hood on
Automobile Distribution, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 14, 2015, 5:38 PM),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/12/ftc-opens-hood-automobiledistribution [https://perma.cc/GU9B-THTJ].
48. For one definition, see The Power of Connection: Peer-to-Peer Businesses: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 1 (2014), http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/115-2014_revised_sundararajan_testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3VU-W67W] (written statement
of Arun Sundararajan, Professor and NEC Faculty Fellow, New York University Stern School of
Business). The FTC conducted a workshop to explore competition issues in the “sharing economy”
in June 2015. See The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/06/sharingeconomy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators
[https://perma.cc/ZE47-FAHC]
(last
visited Feb. 5, 2016).
49. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Brendan Reilly, Alderman, Chi. City
Council
(Apr.
15,
2014)
[hereinafter
FTC
Letter
to
Brendan
Reilly],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-honorablebrendan-reilly-concerning-chicago-proposed-ordinance-o2014-1367/140421chicagoridesharing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52J9-PETX] (encouraging the City of Chicago to adopt regulations that would
facilitate, not inhibit, the operation of ride-sharing services); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff
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have sought to employ the regulatory process to impede new rivals. As
is discussed at length in Section II.B, today’s health care markets,
especially those related to health care professionals, exhibit many if not
all of these characteristics.
1.

Pervasive Historical Regulation

First and foremost, these markets are already subject to detailed and
pervasive regulation. Such regulation heightens the incentives of
industry participants not only to become well-versed in the features and
requirements of the regulatory system, but also to view it as a vehicle for
promoting their self-interest. Economists have labelled the possible end
result “regulatory capture,” which can transform regulation in whole or
part from a method of serving the public to one focused on serving the
interests of the regulated.51 The threat to competition from capture can
be amplified when government authorities assign the task of interpreting
and enforcing regulations to self-interested industry participants.52
This is especially true in health care markets. As has already been
discussed, health care professionals of many types have long been the
focus of comprehensive regulation to protect the public from unqualified
or unethical professionals. Typically, such regulations establish the
terms of entry into a business, trade or profession, including the
requirements for education, training, and certification or licensure. In

to Jacques P. Lerner, Gen. Counsel, D.C. Taxicab Comm’n (June 7, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comments-districtcolumbia-taxicab-commission-concerning-proposed-rulemakings-passenger/130612dctaxicab.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SFE-H9BZ] (encouraging District of Columbia to adopt forward-looking
regulations that would facilitate development of new transportation services).
50. See, e.g., Klint Finley, Chattanooga Is Offering Internet Faster than Google Fiber, WIRED
(Oct. 15, 2015, 4:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/chattanooga-is-offering-internet-fasterthan-google-fiber/ [https://perma.cc/3432-YLPV] (noting efforts by Comcast to block lower cost,
higher quality municipally-supplied broadband services); see also James Surowiecki, The Wait-forGoogle-to-Do-It
Strategy,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(June
23,
2015),
http://www.technologyreview.com/review/538411/the-wait-for-google-to-do-it-strategy
[https://perma.cc/XN55-AUUC] (describing antiquated regulatory framework for broadband and the
competitive impact of Google Fiber’s entry).
51. See generally DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 687–91 (4th ed. 2005) (describing and explaining capture theory). As Carlton and
Perloff explain, because “various interest groups are affected differently by regulation and compete
to influence legislation. . . . Those that are the best organized and most affected by regulation spend
the most money attempting to promote their own interest through legislation and sympathetic
regulators.” Id. at 687; see also Gavil, supra note 7, at 1911–12 (discussing the effect of capture
theory on regulated trades and professions).
52. This was a concern of the Supreme Court in North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners. See supra note 8.
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competition terms, “conditions of entry” are typically established and
evaluated by regulation.53
Existing regulations also may be structured in a very particular way
that can itself exacerbate their impact on competition. For example, and
as observed in Section I.C, the varied service providers in the health care
fields typically have been regulated in discrete silos that promote a
perception of distinctiveness, both with respect to function and
competence. As a result, different types of health care professionals
appear to be walled off from each other even though their competencies
can overlap. This has the effect of creating and perpetuating the
perception by service consumers that the professions are entirely
distinct.54
2.

Existing Regulations Reflect a Dominant “Legacy” Business
Model

A second common characteristic is that the existing regulatory
scheme is grounded in a specific and dominant business model, often
one that developed over decades or longer. Such regulatory schemes
encode policy priorities and compromises that reflect past assessments
of the marketplace, methods of doing business, and the public interest.55
They will thus tend to reflect static notions of what was required to
protect public health and safety based on the practices, research, and
understandings of their time. These regulations may also consciously or

53. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 12 (“Licensure is, by its nature, a
process that establishes the conditions for entry into an occupation.”).
54. This is true in other industries, as well. For example, motor vehicle transportation is often
regulated through local codes that separately address “taxis,” “sedans,” and “limousines,” and these
silos tend to be created in such a way as to maintain the perception of distinctiveness of the three
despite the obvious potential for competitive overlap. See, e.g., FTC Letter to Brendan Reilly, supra
note 49; see also Modernizing Regulation in the Canadian Taxi Industry, COMPETITION BUREAU
CAN., http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04007.html [https://perma.cc/
9ZRZ-VVUA] (last updated Nov. 26, 2015).
55. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, POSSIBLE ANTICOMPETITIVE BARRIERS TO E-COMMERCE:
WINE (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffreport-concerning-possible-anticompetitive-barriers-e-commerce-wine/winereport2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MKX-SDBQ] (discussing long-standing state regulatory impediments to the
interstate sale of wines directly by producers to consumers). Another example is the case of
electrical power distribution regulations that reflect the technologies and past integration of
generation and distribution. See supra note 46. Yet another is the regulation of motor vehicle
transportation services. As is true of health care professions, many local jurisdictions have long
divided these services into seemingly distinct silos, treating “taxi,” “sedan” or “black car,” and
“limousine” services as distinct, in effect limiting the degree to which they might compete. The
competitive constraints of this approach have been exposed by the advent of smartphone-based
applications that provide for a variety of services. See supra note 54.

09 - Gavil Koslov.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/27/2016 3:15 PM

170

[Vol. 91:147

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

unconsciously reflect the social mores of their times, including implicit
assumptions about the likely gender and race of various service
providers and the role they should play in the delivery of services. In this
way, regulation can create, promote, and reinforce a sense of normalcy
around a particular hierarchy of professionals.56 Such a hierarchy,
especially once codified by laws and regulations, can itself be difficult to
dislodge, even when it no longer appears justified or well-adapted to
changed circumstances and times. In many ways, therefore, legacy
regulations capture but a snapshot of the way things worked at the time
of their origin; unless and until the regulations are challenged, they can
perpetuate an approach that has become dated.
From a competition policy perspective, legacy regulations can be
profoundly stifling for innovation and they can slow the pace of change.
They tend to entrench a specific business model and can forestall the
development of new business models, even when not designed to do so
intentionally. The consequence, however, is the same as if the
regulations had been adopted to exclude alternatives: the entire
regulatory scheme develops around a specific perception of how
products should be produced or services should be provided, and it
embeds that model as the only approach that can satisfy the regulations’
requirements.57
3.

Market Conditions Are Changing

In the well-established literature on cartel formation, cartel-like
stability is largely dependent on the ability of cartel members to control
for changing market conditions.58 In many product and service markets,
56. While the sociology of gender-based stereotypes is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
worth noting that the existing hierarchy of health care professionals likely is tied to historical gender
roles, whereby most physicians were male and most nurses were female. Even today, gender biases
persist: according to one respected source, over eighty percent of professional active nurses in the
United States are female. Total Number of Professionally Active Nurses, by Gender, HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-number-of-professionally-activenurses-by-gender/#table [https://perma.cc/3WYQ-BL54] (last visited Feb. 5, 2016); see also U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MEN IN NURSING OCCUPATIONS: AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY HIGHLIGHT
REPORT 2 (2013), http://www.census.gov/people/io/files/Men_in_Nursing_Occupations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PCX-WMA5] (reporting that as of 2011, approximately ninety-one percent of
employed nurses in the United States were female). See generally Ann V. Bell et al., The (Stalled)
Progress of Interprofessional Collaboration: The Role of Gender, 28 J. INTERPROFESSIONAL CARE
98 (2014) (arguing that interprofessional collaboration in furtherance of team-oriented health care
delivery is hindered by gender-based occupational status hierarchy, combined with persistent
underrepresentation of women in the physician workforce).
57. For further discussion of the challenge of adapting such legacy regulatory systems to
industries facing disruptive technologies, see Gavil, supra note 7, at 1911–17.
58. See generally ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS
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these conditions include significant fluctuations in market demand, as
well as entry by new firms or the expansion of output by existing ones,
which can be facilitated by new technologies.59 Commentators have
explained, therefore, that exclusion can be and often is an essential
feature of successful cartelization: to achieve stability, a cartel must be
able to control for and respond effectively to new competitive challenges
that might destabilize the cartel and trigger outbreaks of competition.60
Faced with new competition, incumbents have two obvious choices:
embrace or exclude. Incumbents can invite the new rival to join the
cartel, or impede it from entering the market.61
Exclusionary regulation can substitute for this kind of exclusionary
conduct in heavily regulated industries. Long-term and pervasive
regulation can create cartel-like conditions—stability in price,
innovation, and other dimensions of competition, including the
persistence of the dominant business model itself—even when there is a
substantial number of suppliers.62 As noted above, regulation
particularly affects conditions of new entry or expansion. New business
models can present competitive challenges to such a staid and stable
industry and, therefore, may tend to disrupt cartel conditions.
Technology or other factors, such as increased demand, also can play a
role, sometimes prompting or facilitating the development and
emergence of new products, services, and business models that
challenge the existing order. When “the new,” whatever it may be, does
not align closely with the existing business model, its emergence
generates friction with incumbent service providers, who may seek the
PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 235–47 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing economic analysis of
cartel formation).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J.
527, 558 (2013) (“Colluding firms may need to exclude in order for their collusive arrangement to
succeed. They may find it necessary to deter a cheating member through exclusionary conduct, or to
exclude fringe rivals or new entrants in order to prevent new competition from undermining their
collusive arrangement.” (footnotes omitted)); see also GAVIL ET AL., supra note 58, at 235–36.
61. An illustration of this phenomenon is JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d
775 (7th Cir. 1999), in which a cartel of road pavers allegedly recruited and compensated asphalt
producers to refuse to deal with a new, lower-priced road-paving entrant. See also infra notes 99–
100 (citing additional cases and examples).
62. The regulation of motor vehicle transportation services is a prime example. For one recent
account of the efforts of the incumbent taxi industry in New York City to use decades-old
regulations to impede the entry and expansion of software application-based transportation services
such as Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar, see Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Is on a Collision Course with New
York City’s Mayor Again, VERGE (Dec. 4, 2015, 3:51 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/
12/4/9851000/uber-nyc-bill-de-blasio-report-investigation-cap-tax-cuomo [https://perma.cc/8FEWYRFP]. For a description of the economic consequences of limiting entry into the industry, see
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 717–18. See also supra note 54.
AND
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support of regulators, especially if they perceive “the new” to be a
significant competitive threat.63
Even when the competitive threat is not direct, the weight of legacy
regulation can be sufficient to suppress a new business model. Inertia
alone will tend to favor the incumbent. The crucial question then
becomes whether the new model fits within, lies wholly outside, or
simply cannot be squared with the existing regulations.
4.

New Services, Products, or Business Models Are Incompatible
with Legacy Regulations

Regulatory incompatibility is often a path to exclusion. It can be
apparent when a new business model obviously falls within the scope of
existing regulations, but does not share all of its characteristics. In that
case, it will often be argued that the new model is not in compliance
with accepted regulatory norms. In other cases, the new business model
may fall within, but challenge the rationale for, existing regulations,
revealing a need for adaptation and evolution in the regulatory scheme. 64
Incompatibility also can be “manufactured” if the new model seems to
fall outside of the current scheme, prompting calls for the extension of
regulations to bring it within the fold.65 Changing circumstances thus
63. Many of the kinds of regulations that fit this exclusionary profile are also local or regional,
the product of a long-standing allocation of regulatory authority among federal, state, and local
governing authorities. In some cases, incompatibilities develop when new national or even
international business models emerge that inherently challenge the notion of local regulation. This
type of challenge may be the case in the emerging practice of telehealth. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gilman,
Physician Licensure and Telemedicine: Some Competitive Issues Raised by the Prospect of
Practicing Globally While Regulating Locally, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 87, 89 (2011)
(noting that the burgeoning field of telemedicine “promises in various ways to reduce the costs and
extend the reach of many health care services,” but observing that “the advantages of remote and
networked expertise may be poorly accommodated by licensing schemes that were developed to
regulate local medical practices—practices historically dominated by face-to-face encounters
between a physician and her patient” (footnotes omitted)). Localized regulations alone can also raise
the cost of entry, as challengers seek to analyze and comply with myriad regulations across
jurisdictions.
64. For example, in 2008 the North Carolina State Bar sued LegalZoom, arguing that the
company participated in the unlicensed practice of law when it provided a variety of prepaid legal
services, including legal document templates. LegalZoom responded with an antitrust suit directed
at the Bar and accusing it of using its authority to impede new forms of competition. The Bar and
LegalZoom reached a settlement in 2015 that includes a promise by the Bar to support revisions to
its definition of the practice of law. See Terry Carter, LegalZoom Resolves $10.5M Antitrust Suit
Against North Carolina State Bar, ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2015, 3:15 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/legalzoom_resolves_10.5m_antitrust_suit_against_north_c
arolina_state_bar [https://perma.cc/55KG-4U56].
65. For a possible example, see Teladoc, Inc. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 1–15–CV–343 RP,
2015 WL 4103658 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2015), granting a motion preliminarily enjoining a new
provision that required face-to-face physical examination of patients by a physician prior to
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may highlight not only exclusionary aspects of existing regulations, but
also prompt efforts to create or fortify incompatibilities. In either event,
incompatibility is the lever most typically used to impede new rivalry.
Rivals may advocate for change; incumbents for the status quo.
Incompatibility is a matter of degree. The regulator has several
options available for responding to regulatory incompatibility. Some
approaches inevitably amplify the incompatibility in ways that are more
likely to impede competition. Others may allow for, or even facilitate,
evolution and innovation in the marketplace, leading to a new order that
may be more conducive to evolution and more responsive to consumer
demands.
5.

Incentives for Incumbent Firms to Seek Protectionist Regulation

When these four factors are present, incumbent service providers may
well have the incentive to seek regulatory protection as an alternative to
launching a market-based competitive response to new sources of
competition. Operating as if they were a covert cartel—but with the
“cover” of the public regulatory process—incumbents may seek to
address the changed market conditions and consequent competitive
challenge through exclusionary regulation. If successful, they may be
able to entirely bar the new professional or business model, slow its
impact on incumbent operations, or perhaps just erect impediments to its
acceptance. In short, incumbent firms may have the incentive to use
legislators, regulators, and regulations to obtain protections they cannot
lawfully secure for themselves.66 The negative consequences can be
substantial and durable. Consumers may face higher prices, lower
quality, reduced access, and a loss of innovation.67

prescribing any dangerous drug or controlled substance, effectively barring some of the telephonic
health care services offered by the plaintiff. Another example is the effort by automobile dealers and
their associations in a number of states to oppose efforts by electric vehicle manufacturer Tesla to
sell its vehicles directly to consumers. See supra note 47.
66. For other examinations of the challenges, viewed through the lens of the FTC’s competition
advocacy program, see James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy at the
FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005), and Tara Isa Koslov, Competition Advocacy at the Federal
Trade Commission: Recent Developments Build on Past Successes, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Aug.
2012, at 1, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/6732 [https://perma.cc/HS9CLQVK].
67. For example, for a discussion of how this is unfolding in the electric power industry, see John
Seesel & Jim Mongoven, Competition Sparks Improvements in Local Electricity Markets, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION (Dec. 1, 2015, 12:59 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/
competition-matters/2015/12/competition-sparks-improvements-local-electricity
[https://perma.cc/64M8-GLPF].
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Our discussion of the five characteristics of markets conducive to
exclusionary regulation is not hypothetical: these five characteristics are
evident in the examples already discussed and are ubiquitous in today’s
regulated health care professional markets. In Part II, we discuss a
number of examples that illustrate how incumbents have sought to use
regulation to insulate themselves from competition, by reducing
competition among existing health care providers and impeding entry or
encroachment by new types of providers. So long as reform eludes the
decades-old legacy framework, health care professionals will have the
incentive to use regulations in this way to stifle competition.
II.

REGULATORY MECHANISMS FOR CONSTRAINING
SERVICE OVERLAP COMPETITION

When faced with new competition, incumbents in heavily regulated
industries have frequently urged regulators to react with hostility or at
least extreme caution.68 As we have noted, such anticompetitive
regulatory responses can take the form of either interpretations of
existing regulations or the promotion and adoption of new ones more
specifically targeted at limiting new competition.69 The effects can range
from total exclusion of the new competition, to requirements that force it
to adapt to existing regulatory models in ways that can deprive it of its
competitive advantage, to the imposition of new requirements that can
create or amplify incompatibility with the regulatory scheme. In this
Part, we examine some specific examples of such regulatory responses
and the economic impact they can have on new entry or the expansion of
the provision of health care services.
Health care markets, however, should not be treated as unique so that
they become disconnected from the broader principles that guide
antitrust enforcement and competition policy more generally.70 To

68. For discussion of contemporary examples drawn from a variety of industries, see supra
Section I.D.
69. Supra Section I.D.
70. See, for example, Edith Ramirez, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care—Controlling Costs,
Improving Quality, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2245 (2014), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/
10.1056/NEJMp1408009 [https://perma.cc/V6LJ-UYZN]:
The FTC supports the key aims of health care reform, and we recognize that collaborative and
innovative arrangements among providers can reduce costs, improve quality, and benefit
consumers. But these goals are best achieved when there is healthy competition in provider
markets fostering the sort of dynamic, high-quality, and innovative health care that
practitioners seek and patients deserve.
Id. at 2247; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A
DOSE OF COMPETITION 4 (2004), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-
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anchor the analysis of anticompetitive regulation as it affects
competition in the delivery of health care services, the discussion first
locates it within the broader context of competition policy. The analysis
of exclusionary regulations can be informed by reference to three wellestablished areas of antitrust law enforcement: exclusion, the
suppression of innovation, and coordination by trade groups. As we shall
demonstrate, all three areas share characteristics in common with efforts
to use regulation to eliminate or dampen competition from new business
models and expanded services in the health care industry. Although the
means of exclusion can vary, the economic mechanisms are the same
whether they are a product of private conduct or regulation.71 This welldeveloped framework for assessing anticompetitive conduct, therefore,
can help to identify, analyze, and examine specific instances of
potentially exclusionary regulation.
A.

Analogizing Regulatory Exclusion to Coordinated Exclusionary
Conduct

The common concern of almost all antitrust and competition law is
the prevention of conduct that has the actual or probable effect of
creating, maintaining, or protecting from erosion, market power.72
Anticompetitive collusion can do so by directly reducing competition
between rival firms that coordinate their activity, whereas
anticompetitive exclusion does so indirectly by obstructing the ability of
rival firms to compete in such a way as to facilitate the exercise of

justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLU7-NZ2G] (discussing benefits of competition
in health care markets).
71. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 230 n.73 (1986) (collecting authorities and
noting that the article’s economic analysis of raising rivals’ costs “represents a synthesis of a large
number of economics articles on the subjects of cost-raising and rent-seeking strategies generally, as
well as several articles on vertical integration, vertical foreclosure, exclusive dealing, and special
interest regulation” (emphasis added)); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 372 (“A
firm may raise its rivals’ costs through government regulation.”).
72. The Supreme Court has defined “market power” for antitrust law purposes as “the ability to
raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.” NCAA v. Bd. of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 642 (“A firm (or
group of firms acting together) has market power if it is profitably able to charge a price above that
which would prevail under competition, which is usually taken to be marginal cost.”). The Supreme
Court has acknowledged, however, that price is just one dimension of competition. See Nat’l Soc. of
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“The assumption that competition is the
best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain—
quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by
the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”).
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market power.73 Although collusion has been described as the “supreme
evil” of antitrust,74 as Professor Jonathan Baker has persuasively argued,
“anticompetitive exclusion, like anticompetitive collusion, must be
understood as a core concern of competition policy.”75 Other
commentators have similarly argued that exclusionary strategies that are
likely to harm competition and unlikely to present any procompetitive
benefits ought to “be at the core of an enforcement agenda that
challenges exclusionary conduct.”76 As Baker points out, however,
collusion and exclusion often go hand-in-hand.77 Many of the most wellknown and successful antitrust cases have involved allegations of
exclusion,78 and many of the formative Supreme Court cases that are
often thought of as involving collusion also have involved exclusion.79
Indeed, Baker argues that successful exclusion may be a prerequisite for
successful collusion.80 That is often the case with efforts by incumbent
firms to use regulation to insulate themselves from competition by
excluding rival service providers, but exclusion can benefit incumbent
firms even when they are not colluding and even when they individually
lack market power.
73. Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp offer this general definition of “anticompetitive
exclusion”:
[A]cts that. . .
(1) are reasonably capable of creating enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing
the opportunities of rivals; and
(2) either (2a) do not benefit consumers at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular
consumer benefits claimed for them, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to any resulting
benefits.
3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651a, at 98 (4th ed. 2015).
74. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
75. Baker, supra note 60, at 532. For an explanation of the economic relationship between
collusion and exclusion, see id. at 556–58.
76. Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975, 978 (2005).
77. Baker, supra note 60, at 536 (“Exclusionary conduct allegations are also central to other
antitrust decisions commonly thought of as alleging collusion.”).
78. Id. at 535–36.
79. Id. at 535–37.
80. Id. Baker cites as examples California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999)
(broad prohibitions on professional advertising were enforced through threats of sanctions and
expulsion), National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1986) (ban
on competitive bidding was implemented through a Code of Ethics and those members who violated
the ban could be threatened with disciplinary action), and NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984) (NCAA member schools who deviate from the association’s agreement to restrict the output
of televised college football games faced expulsion from the NCAA). This has also been true of
some important cases initiated by the government enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Realcomp II,
Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011) (association of real estate brokers violated the antitrust
laws when its members adopted anticompetitive website policies that prohibited nontraditional
listings from being included in the association’s multiple listing service for residential real estate).
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The Law and Economics of Exclusion as Foundation

The most typical forms of exclusion involve conduct that impedes a
rival’s access either to inputs (sometimes called “input foreclosure”) or
to distribution or customers (sometimes called “customer foreclosure”).
In either event, the focus of the inquiry is on whether the challenged
conduct raises the costs for some competitors, reduces their output
capacity or raises their costs of expansion, or reduces their revenues in
such a way as to eliminate them or make them less effective
competitors.81 This raising rivals’ costs (RRC) theory of exclusion
generally describes conduct to raise the costs of competitors with the
purpose and effect of causing them to raise their prices or reduce their
output or fail to expand, thereby allowing the excluding firm or group of
firms to profit by setting a supracompetitive price.82 Total exclusion
from the market is not required to secure this kind of anticompetitive
advantage.83
RRC theory has been influential in a number of the most prominent
modern cases involving allegations of exclusionary conduct.84 For
example, it was an important component of the Justice Department’s
1998 case against Microsoft,85 and more recently was invoked by the
Eleventh Circuit in a case involving exclusive dealing that was brought
by the Federal Trade Commission.86 Both of these cases involved
81. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 71, at 213–14 (“[C]laims of anticompetitive exclusion
should be judged according to whether the challenged practice places rival competitors at a cost
disadvantage sufficient to allow the defendant firm to exercise monopoly power by raising its
price.”).
82. See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed ProfitSacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 315 (2006). The economic theory underlying the theory
of raising rivals’ costs was developed in Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’
Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 371–79.
83. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, ¶ 651b5, at 110, 111 (“RRC theories show
that certain practices that have traditionally been subject to antitrust scrutiny can be anticompetitive
even though they do not literally involve the destruction of rivals . . . . [T]he law has never required
complete market exclusion as a prerequisite to suit.”).
84. For a more complete discussion, see GAVIL ET AL., supra note 58, at 592–98.
85. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[A]lthough Microsoft
did not bar its rivals from all means of distribution, it did bar them from the cost-efficient ones.”).
For an explication of the theory of the government’s case in Microsoft, see ANDREW I. GAVIL &
HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 61–66 (2014).
86. See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 832 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n exclusive dealing
arrangement can be harmful when it allows a monopolist to maintain its monopoly power by raising
its rivals’ costs sufficiently to prevent them from growing into effective competitors.”). For an
analysis of the exclusionary effects at issue in the FTC’s McWane decision, see Steven C. Salop et
al., The Appropriate Legal Standard and Sufficient Economic Evidence for Exclusive Dealing
Under Section 2: The FTC’s McWane Case (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Working Paper No. 1365,
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successful challenges to conduct that sought to deprive rivals of costeffective access to distribution and thus are analogous to regulations that
interfere with a service provider’s ability to reach customers—or, as
Section II.B discusses, in the health care industry, patients.
As the United States v. Microsoft87 court recognized, “the means of
illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad.”88
Various commentators have noted this range of conduct and offered
alternative ways to synthesize the cases into identifiable patterns.89
Regardless of their form, however, anticompetitive strategies utilize a
common economic mechanism: by raising rival’s costs, they can in some
circumstances facilitate the exercise of market power or otherwise
insulate a dominant firm or group of incumbent firms from competition.
As Professors Hemphill and Wu have explained:
When harmful, these [exclusionary] methods may weaken the
rival, for example, by preventing it from achieving the
economies of scale required to offer a competitive price. Lack of
scale may also preclude a rival from gaining enough consumer
adoption for a virtuous cycle to kick in, whereby widespread
adoption makes the product more attractive for all users. The
weakened competitor might also find it difficult to finance,
either from external capital markets or retained earnings, the
research and development needed to better displace the
incumbent in the future. In the limit, these tactics may prevent
entry entirely.90
Exclusionary regulation fits comfortably within this conceptual
framework. In almost all of its forms, the probability that it will harm
competition depends in the first instance on its tendency to successfully
impede a rival firm’s or a class of rival firms’ access to inputs or
customers by imposing additional costs on, or erecting other barriers to,

2014), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1365/.http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/
facpub/1365/ [https://perma.cc/PC39-4CNF]; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73,
¶ 651b5, at 110 n.36 (collecting cases that have acknowledged the raising rival’s costs theory).
87. 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
88. Id. at 58; see also C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182,
1200 (2013) (“Anticompetitive exclusion can occur by a wide variety of means.”).
89. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 60, at 538–43 (identifying three types of practices that courts have
identified as potentially exclusionary: constraints imposed on rival conduct, the purchase of
exclusionary rights, and commitments to tough competition); see also Hemphill & Wu, supra note
88, at 1200–09 (classifying conduct that unreasonably forecloses competition into six categories that
have been recognized in the case law: simple exclusion, recruiting agents, overbuying an input,
tying and bundling, resale price maintenance, and most favored nation provisions).
90. Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88, at 1200.
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entry.91 In doing so, such regulations can help perpetuate the market
power of incumbent firms or the collective market power of groups of
small firms and otherwise insulate them from all dimensions of
competition, not only price, but also quality and innovation. Not
surprisingly, therefore, as illustrated in Section I.D, such restrictive
regulations are often advocated by incumbent firms either in parallel or
through explicit coordination.92 And whether accomplished through
private conduct or regulation, RRC can impede innovation in the
marketplace, especially when it is targeted at the new business models or
service delivery methods used by service providers.
Before turning back to an examination of specific examples from the
health care services field, however, it is valuable to consider how RRC
relates to two additional areas of antitrust law enforcement: (1) the
suppression of innovation, and (2) trade association activity. An
examination of these cases lends further context to the analysis of
exclusionary regulations and completes the framework for identifying
and analyzing anticompetitive instances of regulation.
2.

Protecting Innovation and Innovation Competition

The protection of competition sparked by innovation has long been a
concern of antitrust law.93 That concern has been evident in cases
involving both collusion and exclusion to suppress innovation.94 It has
taken on even greater importance in today’s technology-driven and
dynamic economy, where new products and new business methods can
pose substantial competitive challenges to status quo firms. As we
observed in Section I.D, the competitive threat of such changes in the
marketplace can lead incumbent firms to respond with exclusionary
strategies.95 Indeed, one of the paradigmatic early cases on exclusion
91. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 33 (“To the extent that rigid APRN
supervision requirements may inhibit the growth of APRN-staffed retail clinics or prevent
alternative settings from operating at all, such restrictions may deny consumers important price and
non-price benefits of innovation in health care delivery.”).
92. Collective efforts to petition or lobby the government for such anticompetitive regulations
may be beyond the reach of antitrust enforcement. For a discussion, see Gavil, supra note 7, at
1916–17.
93. See generally GAVIL ET AL., supra note 58, at 1162–72 (discussing various ways in which
antitrust law has sought to deter conduct that suppresses innovation); see also Timothy Wu, Taking
Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313
(2012) (arguing for a broader commitment to using antitrust law to promote innovation).
94. For recent discussions, see Baker, supra note 60, at 559–62; Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88,
at 1210–13 (discussing what they describe as “anticompetitive parallel exclusion” and emphasizing
the importance of its impact on innovation).
95. As Professors Hemphill and Wu argue, “[w]here the innovative product is a serious
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involved efforts by a dominant local newspaper to squelch the
competitive threat of then new technology: over-the-air AM radio.96
Similarly and more recently, in Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC97 the FTC
successfully challenged coordinated efforts by a local board of realtors
to suppress competition from new, internet-based and lower-cost sales
models.98 Many other examples from the annals of antitrust history can
be cited to illustrate how incumbent firms can pursue exclusionary
strategies rather than competitive ones in response to new products,
services, and business models that challenge the status quo.99
3.

Trade Associations as Facilitators

Strategies to suppress innovation are often pursued by professionals
in cooperation with other members of their trade, sometimes through
private standard setting, trade association rules including codes of
conduct, and government regulation.100 A number of such cases have
arisen in the health care industry, often in connection with the activity of
existential threat to members of the oligopoly, the incentive to block or co-opt the entrant can
(understandably) be strong.” Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88, at 1212.
96. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (incumbent newspaper refused to
accept advertisements from its customers who also placed advertisements with new radio station).
For an analysis of Lorain Journal through the lens of modern exclusion theory, see GAVIL ET AL.,
supra note 58, at 596–98.
97. 635 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2011).
98. Id. at 829–34 (finding substantial evidence that Realcomp’s “website policy,” which restricted
consumer access to discounted online and limited service business models, was unreasonably
anticompetitive).
99. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500–01 (1988)
(use of private industry standard-setting process to exclude new competitive threat); Am. Soc’y of
Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (concluding that non-profit standard-setting
group could be held liable under the antitrust laws for allowing its members to manipulate its
standards to exclude their rival’s product); United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 241 (2d
Cir. 2003) (finding no error in the district court’s finding “that product innovation and output has
been stunted by the challenged policies”); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (“[I]t would be inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to
squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will—particularly in industries marked by rapid
technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts.”). For a discussion of the exclusionary theories
in both Visa and Allied Tube, see Hemphill & Wu, supra note 88, at 1191–93. For an additional
discussion of the exclusionary possibilities in the context of private standard-setting organizations,
such as those involved in Allied Tube and American Society of Mechanical Engineers, see Creighton
et al., supra note 76, at 987–88.
100. See supra note 99; see also Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961) (holding that a gas burner manufacturer stated an antitrust claim for relief against
trade association and its gas supplier members who refused to approve manufacturer’s burner for
use by gas utilities); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (condemning
boycott by designers and manufacturers of women’s garments directed at retailers who also resold
allegedly “pirated” designs of lower cost rival manufacturers).
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trade associations.101 Indeed, trade groups of various kinds have
frequently been, and continue to be, a persistent focus of antitrust
enforcement. The pervasiveness of such groups in the health care trades
draws attention to the connection between the anticompetitive acts of
trade groups and those of self-interested state boards charged with
enforcing professional regulations, a connection that the Supreme Court
recently acknowledged:
In important regards, agencies controlled by market participants
are more similar to private trade associations vested by States
with regulatory authority than to the agencies [Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)] considered. And as the
Court observed three years after Hallie, “[t]here is no doubt that
the members of such associations often have economic
incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards
set by such associations have a serious potential for
anticompetitive harm.102
101. One example is American Medical Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), which also
illustrates the relationship between collusion and exclusion. The FTC prevailed in its challenge to
certain AMA ethical rules that restrained advertising, including the dissemination of price
information, and solicitation. Id. at 450. The FTC also successfully challenged the AMA’s
prohibitions of various kinds of contractual arrangements between physicians and non-physicians,
restrictions that limited the business models available to physicians. Id. at 451–52. The case can be
understood, therefore, as an additional illustration of the interdependence of collusion and
exclusion. See also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (holding that, although FTC’s
use of abbreviated rule of reason analysis in connection with certain prohibitions on professional
advertising was improper, the prohibitions were enforced by the association through threats of
sanctions and expulsion of advertising members). For a more recent example, see Kissing Camels
Surgery Center, LLC v. Centura Health Corp., 111 F. Supp. 3d 1180 (D. Colo. 2015), denying a
motion to dismiss an antitrust claim that a trade association, hospitals with surgery centers, and
insurers conspired to refuse to enter into necessary transfer agreements with non-hospital
ambulatory surgical centers which had the effect of impeding their ability to compete.
102. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exm’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 486 U.S. at 500) (rejecting application
of state action doctrine to state board of dental examiners, which sought to eliminate competition
from low-cost teeth whitening services provided by non-dentists); see also S.C. State Bd. of
Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the board was not insulated from
antitrust liability for its efforts to prevent dental hygienists from providing basic dental care services
to underserved populations). Indeed, knowing that conduct by the trade group may violate the
antitrust laws could provide the needed incentive for group members to instead turn to government
regulation to achieve the same, prohibited ends without incurring the risk of personal liability. See
also Memorandum from Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Guidance on Active Supervision of State
Boards Controlled by Market Participants (Oct. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
attachments/competition-policy-guidance/active_supervision_of_state_boards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5BWS-9T8L] (providing additional guidance for states on compliance with the
Supreme Court’s decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners); Blair & Durrance,
supra note 31, at 31–32 (modeling the harm to competition and consumers that can occur when
licensure and related regulations are used by one group of health care providers to exclude a
competing group of providers, with no offsetting quality of care benefits).
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In assessing how regulation can be used to impede competition,
therefore, it can be revealing to examine the economic underpinnings of
antitrust law enforcement actions that have been directed at
anticompetitive conduct by trade groups. That economic analysis is
instructive whether those actions were adopted and implemented by selfinterested boards, as in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners
v. FTC,103 or are the product of trade group conduct.104 Such cost-raising
strategies are common in examples of regulations that impede
competition.
This Section provided an analytical framework that can be applied to
specific recent examples of exclusionary regulation in the health care
professions. To construct that framework, it drew upon three wellestablished areas of antitrust: the law and economics of anticompetitive
exclusion, suppression of innovation, and trade group and association
activity that eliminated competition. In the illustrations that follow,
exclusionary regulation often lies at the intersection of these three areas
of antitrust. Virtually all of the examples that follow illustrate how
industry incumbents in the health care industry, either in parallel or
through coordination, have sought to use regulation to impede the access
of their perceived rival service providers to patients and other purchasers
of their services. In some instances, the rival providers were attempting
to expand competitive overlap with incumbent service providers by
advancing new and innovative service or business models. The
successful exclusion of such new providers in turn can diminish the
opportunity and incentives for future innovations in service delivery.
Regardless of context, in each instance the conduct’s anticompetitive
effect can be attributed to its tendency to alter the conditions of entry
into the field by raising the costs, or reducing the revenues, of the
targeted rival group, without substantial justification.105 With this
foundation in place, the next Section turns to a sampling of recent
illustrations.

103. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 135 S. Ct. 1101.
104. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 212–15 (7th Cir. 1984) (remanding an
antitrust challenge by chiropractors against various medical trade groups alleging conduct that
impaired their ability to compete with medical doctors).
105. For a general discussion of the consequences of regulations that limit entry, see CARLTON &
PERLOFF, supra note 51, at 716–18.
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Anticompetitive Regulation in the Health Care Industry: A
Sampling

To make our analysis more concrete, we next identify specific
examples of health care professional regulations that may impede
competition. When evaluated in the context of the overlap areas in
Figure 1 above, the exclusionary nature of these regulations becomes
apparent: they make it impossible to fully realize the competitive
benefits that arise when different types of health care providers can
safely and effectively perform at least some of the same services.
Further, the public safety arguments proffered to justify the specific
restrictions at issue appeared to be either exaggerated or unsupported.
All of these examples are drawn from advocacy comments filed by
FTC staff in recent years. As an important component of the agency’s
competition mission, upon request FTC staff regularly engages in
competition advocacy by filing comments that analyze the competitive
effects of proposed state legislation or regulations.106 From January 2010
through November 2015, FTC staff sent more than fifteen advocacy
comments to state legislators regarding scope-of-practice restrictions,107
and also published a March 2014 staff policy paper, Policy Perspectives:
Competition and the Regulation of Advanced Practice Nurses.108
The FTC staff policy paper, drawing from and expanding upon prior
FTC staff comments, focuses on various forms of mandatory physician
supervision of APRNs.109 Slightly more than half the states currently
106. Advocacy Filings, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/advocacy/
advocacy-filings [https://perma.cc/FLB5-ZKRN] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) (“When government
bodies and other organizations consider cases or policy decisions that affect consumers or
competition, the FTC may offer insight and expertise to decision makers by filing an advocacy
letter.”); see also Gavil, supra note 7, at 1902–05 (discussing sources of FTC’s authority to engage
in competition advocacy); Cooper et al., supra note 66, at 1092–99 (describing history of FTC
advocacy comments from 1974–2004); Koslov, supra note 66, at 6–8 (describing examples of FTC
competition advocacy comments involving intellectual property, innovation, and health care).
107. To access FTC staff competition advocacy comments, see Advocacy Filings, supra note 106.
108. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36. Ms. Koslov was one of two principal authors of
the policy paper (with Daniel J. Gilman), and Professor Gavil supervised the project as thenDirector of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning. See also Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman,
Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: Federal Competition Policy and the Scope of Practice, 24
HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 143, 171–206 (2014) (discussing and evaluating FTC staff competition
advocacies affecting various health care professionals).
109. Similar issues have arisen with supervision requirements imposed on dental hygienists. See,
e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Valencia Seay, Senator, Ga. State Senate (Jan. 29,
2016) [hereinafter FTC Letter to Valencia Seay], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-georgia-state-senator-valencia-seay-concerning-georgiahouse-bill-684/160201gadentaladvocacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y5P-J6ME] (supporting proposed
legislation that would broaden settings where dental hygienists can provide preventive dental care
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restrict otherwise qualified APRNs from practicing to the top of their
license,110 unless they also satisfy an additional layer of physician
supervision requirements that may include, for example, mandatory
chart review, specified numbers or types of physician consultations, or
physician approval of practice plans or protocols.111 They may also
include mandatory “collaborative practice agreements,” whereby an
APRN must secure (and often pay for) a written agreement with a
physician, in which the physician specifies acceptable terms for the
APRN’s practice.112 In many of these states, such supervision is a
general prerequisite to licensed APRN practice; in some states, these or
other restrictions pertain to large parts of practice, such as prescribing
medications or diagnosing illnesses. The physician becomes a
“gatekeeper” for the APRN’s entry and continued access to the
profession—“effectively giv[ing] one group of health care professionals
the ability to restrict access to the market by another, competing group
of health care professionals, thereby denying health care consumers the
benefits of greater competition.”113
services without direct in-person supervision by a dentist, which likely would enhance competition
and expand access to care); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Teneale E. Johnson, Exec.
Sec’y, Bd. of Dental Exam’rs (Nov. 16, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-maine-board-dental-examiners-concerning-proposed-rulesallow-independent-practice/111125mainedental.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VYX-6LMP] (concerning
proposed rules to allow independent practice dental hygienists to take x-rays in underserved areas);
Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Randall Vaughn, Sec’y of State, Ga. Bd. of Dentistry (Dec.
30,
2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-georgia-board-dentistry-concerning-proposed-amendments-board-rule-150.5-0.3governing-supervision-dental-hygienists/101230gaboarddentistryletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC4EUYK7] (concerning proposed amendments to Board rule 150-5-.0.3 governing supervision of dental
hygienists).
110. See AANP State Practice Environment Data, supra note 35 (summarizing the APRN
practice environment in each state, including comparative characterizations of “full,” “reduced,” or
“restricted” practice).
111. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 28. For a general (albeit somewhat outdated)
summary of state-by-state supervisory requirements, see IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra
note 11, at 157–61, tbl.3-A1. See also GRANT R. MARTSOLF ET AL., THE IMPACT OF FULL PRACTICE
AUTHORITY FOR NURSE PRACTITIONERS AND OTHER ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES IN
OHIO
(2015),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR848/
RAND_RR848.pdf [https://perma.cc/43G2-3SZP].
112. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 28. Of the ten most populous states, six are
listed in the “restricted” category (California, Texas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and
Michigan) and the other four are in the “reduced” category (New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and
Ohio). AANP State Practice Environment Data, supra note 35; see Resident Population Data, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-dens-text.php
[https://perma.cc/2X39-K5ZE] (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
113. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 2; see also FTC Letter to Valencia Seay, supra
note 109, at 3 (“By increasing the availability of dental hygienists’ services outside of dentists’
offices, these initiatives can increase the number of suppliers of preventive dental care. The
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A subset of related regulations restrict the ability of APRNs to write
prescriptions independently—typically for controlled substances114 used
for pain relief, but sometimes even for basic drugs like antibiotics. When
these restrictions are in place, an APRN can only write prescriptions
subject to a collaborative practice agreement or another form of
physician supervision, such as the physician’s “delegation” to the APRN
of prescribing authority.115 These regulations needlessly reserve for
physicians the power to prescribe, even though credible evidence
establishes that APRNs can safely and effectively prescribe a variety of
medications, and no credible countervailing evidence negates this
conclusion.116 Even with respect to more controversial pain medications,
where scope of practice variations among states create a natural
experiment, it appears that APRNs safely and effectively prescribe
controlled substances in a number of states,117 which calls into question
the legitimacy of other states’ restrictions.

initiatives thereby promote greater competition in the provision of oral health services. Greater
competition may, in turn, enhance access to affordable preventive services, mitigate the broader
health consequences of dentist shortages, and facilitate the development of innovative models for
delivering care.”).
114. “Drugs, substances, and certain chemicals used to make drugs are classified into five (5)
distinct categories or schedules depending upon the drug’s acceptable medical use and the drug’s
abuse or dependency potential.” Drug Scheduling, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN.,
http://www.dea.gov/druginfo/ds.shtml [https://perma.cc/A3TA-S2RA] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016);
see also Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84
Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012)); 21 U.S.C. § 812 (“Schedules of
controlled substances”).
115. Many states restrict prescribing authority by requiring such authority to be explicitly
included in a mandatory collaborative practice agreement, or by requiring an additional act of
delegation that is specific to prescribing. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-33-34(4)(C)–(D) (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (imposing requirements for written protocols and physician
supervision; mandating that prescribing authority for all drugs, including non-controlled substances,
must be delegated pursuant to written protocol and is limited to an APRN’s defined specialty role);
see also supra note 30 (comparing prescribing authority in Wyoming and Texas). For an overview
of each state’s prescribing rules for APRNs, see Laura A. Stokowski, APRN Prescribing Law: A
State-by-State Summary, MEDSCAPE NURSES (June 9, 2015), http://www.medscape.com/
viewarticle/440315 [https://perma.cc/8AMB-XAKY].
116. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36; see also infra notes 141–43 and
accompanying text (citing and interpreting various studies concluding that APRNs prescribe safely
and effectively); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Kent Leonhardt, Senator, Senate of W.
Va. (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staffcomment-senate-west-virginia-concerning-competitive-impact-wv-senate-bill-516-regulation/
160212westvirginia.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ9Q-76KD] (expressing concerns about, inter alia,
proposed legislation that would require certain APRNs to secure a separate prescribing license to
gain independent prescribing authority, and would place control of that new licensure scheme
entirely under the authority of the state’s Board of Medicine or Board of Osteopathy).
117. See, e.g., MARIA SCHIFF, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, THE ROLE OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS
IN MEETING INCREASING DEMAND FOR PRIMARY CARE 12–13 (2012), http://www.nga.org/cms/
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Also relevant to pain medication, FTC staff has filed several
comments relating to scope-of-practice restrictions on certified
registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs), a type of advanced practice nurse
with specialized training in anesthesia and pain management.118 These
restrictions complicate the problem of ensuring adequate access to pain
management, which is a significant public health challenge, particularly
in rural and other underserved communities.119 Some states have adopted
scope of practice laws that prohibit CRNAs from providing anesthesia
and other inpatient pain management services (e.g., epidurals for labor
and delivery) without in-person supervision by an anesthesiologist, thus
undermining the ability of otherwise competent CRNAs to safely
provide expanded access to care in areas with anesthesiologist
shortages.120 In addition, a number of states limit the ability of CRNAs
to independently provide post-operative or chronic pain management in
outpatient settings, without direct physician supervision.121 Again, given
the natural experiment of expanded CRNA practice in a number of states
(including many where Medicare allows direct billing for CRNAprovided services)122 with no evidence of differential safety concerns,123
it becomes difficult to defend the more restrictive approach.
home/nga-center-for-best-practices/center-publications/page-health-publications/col2-content/maincontent-list/the-role-of-nurse-practitioners.html [https://perma.cc/L68J-GCJU] (identifying states in
which APRNs may independently prescribe controlled substances).
118. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff: Massachusetts Should Consider
Removing Physician Supervision Requirements for Nurse Practitioners and Nurse Anesthetists (Jan.
23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-staff-massachusetts-shouldconsider-removing-physician [https://perma.cc/S5R3-CYKX]; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
FTC Staff: Proposed Missouri Legislation May Reduce Patient Access to Pain Management
Services and Increase Prices (Mar. 28, 2012) [hereinafter FTC Missouri Comment],
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/03/ftc-staff-proposed-missouri-legislationmay-reduce-patient-access [https://perma.cc/Z6K6-477Y].
119. See FTC Missouri Comment, supra note 118 (noting that some rural hospitals are located in
counties in which there are no licensed anesthesiologists). See generally INST. OF MED., supra note
32, at 57 (providing recommendations to improve pain management practices in the United States,
including a recognition that “state and federal policy makers, who must craft policies related
to . . . regulation of clinicians’ scope of practice,” are among the sectors that should contribute to
solving the public health challenge of pain management).
120. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Heather A. Steans, Senator, Ill. State
Senate (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftcstaff-comment-honorable-heather.steans-illinois-state-senate-concerning-illinois-senate-bill-1662and-regulation-certified/130424illinois-sb1662.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM9R-ALJB].
121. Id.
122. Although Medicare imposes a supervision requirement for CRNAs, since 2001 individual
states have been permitted to “opt out” of the supervision requirement. Medicare and Medicaid
Programs; Hospital Conditions of Participation: Anesthesia Services, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,762 (Nov. 13,
2001) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 416.42(d) (2016)). Effective November 13, 2001, CMS established
an exemption for Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists from the physician supervision
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In recent years, FTC staff has expanded its scope of practice advocacy
to address restrictions on an emerging profession: dental therapists, who,
as discussed above,124 are trained to provide some dental services
traditionally provided only by licensed dentists. FTC staff commented
on a type of restriction that arose at an “upstream” level: accreditation
standards for dental therapy education programs. 125 When the
Commission on Dental Accreditation (CODA) proposed draft
accreditation standards, the proposed standards implicitly assumed that
all dental therapy students would be trained to practice only under the
direct supervision of dentists.126 This framework all but guaranteed that
graduates of dental therapy programs would be deemed to lack the
training necessary to practice safely without direct supervision, which
inevitably would influence scope of practice laws and constrain the
discretion of states as they created licensing regimes for this new
profession. Mandatory supervision would thwart one of the main
requirement. “This exemption recognized a Governor’s written request to CMS attesting that he or
she is aware of the State’s right to an exemption of the requirement and that is in the best interests
of the State’s citizens to exercise this option.” Conditions for Coverage (CfCs) & Conditions of
Participations (CoPs): Spotlight, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/CFCsAndCoPs/Spotlight.html
[https://perma.cc/LQS4-LDNE] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). In opt-out states, it is possible to bill
Medicare directly for CRNA services, without requiring the signature of a supervising physician. At
least seventeen states have opted out. Id. Governors often determine that expanded CRNA practice
authority is particularly critical in rural areas where anesthesiologists are in short supply. Hospitals
and other health care facilities otherwise might be unable to treat emergencies or schedule
procedures requiring anesthesia, unless an anesthesiologist were physically present. See generally
Fact Sheet Concerning State Opt-Outs and November 13, 2001 CMS Rule, AM. ASS’N NURSE
ANESTHETISTS,
http://www.aana.com/advocacy/stategovernmentaffairs/Pages/Fact-SheetConcerning-State-Opt-Outs.aspx [https://perma.cc/8BCV-WXKR] (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).
123. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Kay Khan, Representative, Mass. House
of Representatives 8 & nn.67–68 (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-massachusetts-house-representatives-regardinghouse-bill-6-h.2009-concerning-supervisory-requirements-nurse-practitioners-nurse-anesthetists/
140123massachusettnursesletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2URB-4NXC] (citing various sources from
safety literature relating to CRNA practice, none of which provide evidence of patient harm).
124. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
125. FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41. FTC staff provided a follow-up comment a year
later, commending CODA for its revisions and encouraging CODA to finalize and adopt
accreditation standards without undue delay. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Urges
Dental Accreditation Commission to Adopt Dental Therapy Accreditation Standards (Dec. 1, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-staff-urges-dental-accreditationcommission-adopt-dental [https://perma.cc/QAE8-5BGD].
126. FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41, at 1–2 (noting proposed standards stated that
“diagnosis and treatment planning are the responsibility of a supervising dentist,” which “may deter
the development of dental education programs that would train dental therapists to provide such
services under the level of supervision required by each state . . . even when states determine that
patient safety may not require [on-site supervision by a dentist]”).
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purposes of dental therapists: to expand access to dental care, especially
for underserved populations.127 The FTC staff comment encouraged
CODA to consider making the accreditation standards neutral with
respect to the role of supervising dentists, and to develop accreditation
standards that would train dental therapists to practice without an on-site
supervising dentist, thus preserving individual states’ flexibility to
address supervision issues in their licensure and scope of practice
laws.128 In other words, the comment acknowledged the interest of
regulators in addressing any genuine health and safety concerns, but
encouraged them to do so without imposing unjustifiable barriers to
entry and expansion of services.
Finally, in 2014, FTC staff commented on proposed Texas regulations
that likely would have preserved the long-standing status quo approach
by stifling the development of new business models for delivering dental
services.129 The proposed regulations would have prohibited dentists
from entering into contracts with “unlicensed persons” for the provision
of non-clinical services, such as administrative and business
management functions.130 The proposed regulations also would have
expanded the Board’s authority to take disciplinary actions against
dentists that entered into such contracts.131
Although the draft regulations did not explicitly mention it, the
proposals appeared to have been targeted at dental service organizations
(DSOs), and would have had the effect of discouraging dentists from
127. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 150A.105 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.)
(“Limited practice settings. A dental therapist licensed under this chapter is limited to primarily
practicing in settings that serve low-income, uninsured, and underserved patients or in a dental
health professional shortage area.”); FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41, at 5 & n.40
(“Dental therapists are likely to be most effective in expanding access to care, especially to the
underserved, when they are allowed under appropriate circumstances to evaluate a patient and
develop a treatment plan under the supervision of a remotely-located dentist.”); Dental Crisis in
America: The Need to Expand Access: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Primary Health & Aging
of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. 28 (2012) (statement of Christy
Jo Fogarty, Registered Dental Hygienist, Master of Science, Oral Health Practitioner),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg89737/pdf/CHRG-112shrg89737.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E5C2-9BJ6] (if dental therapists must have a dentist on-site, they cannot “do much
to improve access to care for vulnerable populations”).
128. FTC 2013 CODA Comment, supra note 41, at 9.
129. Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Simone Salloum, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Tex.
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs (Oct. 6, 2014) [hereinafter FTC TX DSO Comment],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-texas-stateboard-dental-examiners/141006tsbdecomment1.pdf [https://perma.cc/38MH-D67D] (commenting
on proposed law that would restrict ability of dentists to enter into agreements with non-dentists for
the provision of administrative services).
130. Id. at 1, 4.
131. Id.
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affiliating with them. The comment expressed the staff’s concern that
such restrictions could be anticompetitive:
Dentists generally have little training in administration, which
means that carrying out administrative tasks can be time
consuming. Relieving dentists of the need to perform
administrative tasks could increase the amount of dentistry
services dentists could provide, and lower the costs of providing
dental services. In addition, DSOs may support entry into Texas,
or prevent exit, by dentists who prefer to affiliate with a DSO.
This new entry may lead to lower prices, expanded services, and
improved access to dental services. Because the proposed rules
may well deter licensed dentists from contracting with DSOs,
the proposed rules appear likely to impede competition and
deprive consumers of these potential benefits.132
This small sampling of the FTC staff’s most recent competition
advocacy work in the health care field continues long-standing efforts by
the agency to, first, identify anticompetitive laws and regulations (both
current and proposed) and, second, provide a framework that regulators
and legislators can use to evaluate the potential for anticompetitive
harm. As argued in Section II.A, all of the staff’s analysis consistently
focuses on entry-related regulations that impose costs on potential rivals
and ensure that, even if they do successfully enter the market, revenues
generated by their services will be shared with incumbent providers. The
incumbent providers are often observable behind the scenes in these
regulatory proposals. The competitive threat is always the same: by
impeding change, including the emergence of innovative new delivery
models, the troublesome regulations would have the effect of
perpetuating the status quo and stifling competition in the marketplace.
III. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE
WORKFORCE REGULATION
A.

Guiding Principles for Regulators

As illustrated in Part II, regulations can favor incumbents to the
detriment of competition in a number of ways. Some have completely
barred competition, as by imposing unjustifiable limits on the scope of
practice. Others, either working within existing regulatory schemes or by
amending and expanding them, can alter the economic incentives of new
service providers in a way that dampens their incentives to compete or
132. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted). Efforts to restrict the ability of professionals to affiliate with nonprofessionals was also an issue in the FTC’s 1980 case against the AMA. See supra note 101.
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relegates them to being less aggressive and less effective competitors.
Supervision requirements in both the medical and dental fields provide
illustrations. Often, these regulations have the effect of depriving new
rivals of the very competitive advantage that drives consumer interest in
their products, services, or business models.
Regulators and health care industry stakeholders should consider a
different path: evolutionary adaptation guided by some of the lessons of
competition law enforcement and policy. We offer three guiding
principles: (1) understand and integrate competition concerns into the
consideration of regulation; (2) appreciate the self-perpetuating
tendencies of regulations shaped by the business models of their time;
and (3) consider reforms that move regulation away from approaches
that lock-in particular business models to more flexible and adaptable
standards that can account for continued change now and in the future,
for example, by being explicitly subject to periodic review or by being
crafted to allow for evolution without periodic revision.
As FTC staff has consistently asserted in its competition advocacies,
regulators in the health care field should be attentive to the competition
consequences of regulation and should integrate competition concerns
into their analysis.133 In repeating this point here, however, we mean to
drive it home more specifically. Sound competition policy does not
preclude some degree of regulation. Once the need for at least some
regulation is established, however—as is often the case in the health care
field—the discussion becomes more particularized. The inquiry shifts
from asking “whether to regulate” to asking whether some very specific
provision of a regulation is likely to harm competition and how. One
valuable lesson learned from over a century of antitrust law enforcement
is that competition policymakers must be attentive both to the
characteristics of the specific market and to the unique economic
mechanisms of harm at issue.
In the context of exclusionary regulation, regulators first must
familiarize themselves with the basic characteristics of the marketplace.
More particularly, as described in Section I.D, they must be well-aware
of the circumstances that suggest a market is conducive to abuse of the
regulatory process to protect incumbents, exclude new challengers, and
sacrifice consumer interests. If the regulatory context suggests reasons to
be wary, regulators ought to be especially attentive to the costs,
justifications, and probable consequences of proposed conditions,
especially if they are targeted at challengers and are being advocated by

133. FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 17–18 (describing competition analysis of
regulations that restrict competition).
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long-entrenched incumbents. A series of questions can guide the
analysis. First, does the proposed regulation (or interpretation) bar entry
entirely? Second, if not, will compliance with the regulation (or
interpretation) impose significant costs on market participants? Third, if
it will impose significant costs, are those costs to be borne by all
participants, or are they likely to impact solely the competitive
challenger? Consistent with the teachings of cases and commentary
based on the theory of raising rivals’ costs, the final and critical question
will be whether the impact on the challenger will help to facilitate the
creation of, or perhaps perpetuate the exercise of, market power by
incumbents.
The answers to these questions may suggest that there is a potential
for competitive harm, but they do not end the inquiry. Competition
principles and economic analysis also can help to evaluate the
justifications offered for specific kinds of regulations that may be
exclusionary. FTC staff, for example, has highlighted circumstances
where the health and safety of the public, which is frequently invoked to
justify various types of health care workforce regulation, are exaggerated
or pretextual.134 Similarly, they have consistently argued that, when
some regulation is warranted, regulators ought to adopt the regulation
that is best calibrated to serve a genuine and substantiated public
concern, while minimizing any adverse impact on competition.135 These
have become bedrock principles of the FTC’s competition advocacy
program.
Especially in markets like health care that are undergoing significant
evolution, regulators must also consider the impact of specific
regulations on incentives to innovate, both for incumbents and new
entrants. Regulators ought to carefully scrutinize requests for such
regulations in markets that have been stagnant from the point of view of
innovation, when the challenger threatens to disrupt the status quo, as by
introducing new services or service models. These circumstances are
especially vulnerable to exclusionary regulations and their effects can
stifle the emergence of new services and service models for years to
come.136 Hence, it is also important to inquire whether there are less
134. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 35–36.
135. Id. at 17 (urging regulators to consider whether regulations that appear likely to have an
adverse impact on competition “are narrowly tailored to address [well-founded consumer protection
concerns] without undue harm to competition, or whether less restrictive alternatives are
available”).
136. For example, in the case of the emerging field of dental therapy, accreditation standards that
anticipate on-site supervision by dentists could discourage the creation of education programs
designed to produce independently practicing dental therapists. See supra notes 39–41, 124–28 and
accompanying text. Similarly, if states continue to prohibit the sale of motor vehicles directly to
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restrictive regulatory options that might secure the benefits, but with less
adverse impact on incentives to innovate.137 Exclusionary regulations
can function like a moat, strategically placed around incumbent
competitors in a protective perimeter that insulates them from attack
from new rivals. They can be the product of collusion and have the
effect of exclusion. A more complete understanding of the conditions
under which such regulations can be sought, and an appreciation for the
consequences of their adoption, will be essential to the health care work
force of the future.
Finally, we note that antitrust enforcement agencies can serve a
critical, dual function in supporting this first guiding principle, i.e., that
competitive effects analysis should be an integral part of the policy
calculus. First, when needed, the agencies can help to educate regulators
and legislators by offering their competition expertise to assess the
important characteristics of the industry and to identify and analyze
potentially anticompetitive regulations. More specifically, they can flesh
out the mechanism of exclusion, bringing to bear the kinds of principles
and cases discussed above in Section II.A, to explain the particular ways
in which regulation can hinder competition. In doing so, they can give
voice to consumer interests that may otherwise go unheard or
undervalued. Competition enforcement agencies, however, should
neither be arrogant nor naïve. Local legislators and regulators may often
fully appreciate the anticompetitive potential of regulations, but for
political and other reasons nevertheless may be poised to adopt them in
response to the urging of industry incumbents. In such circumstances,
government advocacy can provide needed transparency and a useful
“sunshine” function, helping to expose possible consumer harm and
informing broader public debate.

consumers, existing manufacturers will be discouraged from competing based on innovative new
methods of internet-based sales. New entrants also may be discouraged from attempting to enter the
market based on methods of distribution that do not rely upon independent dealers. See FTC Letter
to Darwin L. Boorher, supra note 47, at 7–8 (“A direct sales ban deters experimentation with new
and different methods of sales by current auto manufacturers, and also by future entrants to the
market.”).
137. See, e.g., FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 19 (“Regulatory choices that affect
APRN scope of practice may have a direct impact on health care prices, quality, and innovation,
often without countervailing benefits.”); id. at 38 (“APRN licensure and scope of practice
restrictions, like other professional regulations, may advance important consumer interests. But
when these restrictions restrain competition and are not closely tied to legitimate policy goals, they
may do more harm than good.”); see also FTC TX DSO Comment, supra note 129, at 6–7 (“To the
extent possible, restrictions should be narrowly tailored to minimize their potential anticompetitive
effects, and to avoid unduly discouraging innovative and efficient models of practice that could
compete against traditional providers without compromising safety or quality.”).
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In the next and concluding Part, we turn to proposals for reform. Not
the kinds of reforms that have infected the regulatory process and
threatened the capacity of the health care work force to adapt to
changing times. Rather, Section III.B suggests alternative models of
regulation that would be less prone to ensconcing the status quo of
particular business and service models for the delivery of health care,
and more likely to prove attractive to challengers promoting safe, but
innovative health care delivery models now or in the future.
B.

Paths to Reform

Implementation of the principles outlined in Section III.A should help
to diminish the incidence of exclusionary regulations. Here we conclude
by offering several broader, specific suggestions to reform the U.S.
approach to professional regulation in the evolving health care
marketplace. While all of these proposals may be theoretically appealing
from a pure competition perspective, we recognize that some of these
ideas are more provocative than others. We also acknowledge that, as a
practical matter, some reforms are likely to be exceedingly difficult to
implement given the highly politicized nature of state-based professional
regulation and the complex interplay of various interest groups.
The easiest place to start—and, indeed, one of the purposes of this
Article—is to encourage greater recognition that competition between
different types of health care professionals does, in fact, exist and is
likely to become increasingly common in the future. Such competition is
a good thing—likely to reduce costs, expand access, improve quality,
and drive innovation—and the value of these benefits should not be
diminished. Too often, productive discussions about health care provider
competition are suppressed with vague and exaggerated protests of
safety concerns, claims of inadequate training for some types of
providers, or other pretextual arguments.138 Some health care

138. See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, PRIMARY CARE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
ENSURING A QUALITY, PHYSICIAN-LED TEAM FOR EVERY PATIENT (2012); see also id. at i–ii
(“This effort to have nurses practice independent of physicians comes at the very same moment that
medical practice itself is changing to an integrated, team-based approach that includes physicians
and other health professionals. These two approaches take the country and our health care system in
opposite and conflicting directions.”); cf. AANP Responds to the American Academy of Family
Physicians Report, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRAC. (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.aanp.org/component/
content/article/28-press-room/2012-press-releases/1082-aanp-responds-to-aafp-report
[https://perma.cc/VWA5-3SH8] (“The American Academy of Nurse Practitioners strongly supports
patient-centered and team-based care models. However, AANP believes that AAFP’s efforts to link
these evolving models of care with the licensure of nurse practitioner (NP) practice are misdirected
and out of step with today’s environment.”); FTC APRN POLICY PAPER, supra note 36, at 34–35
(refuting argument that physician supervision of APRNs is necessary to promote team-based care;
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professionals seem reluctant to acknowledge that they care about losing
income due to price competition, or that they would rather not have to
compete on dimensions of quality or convenience if a larger pool of
providers were authorized to offer certain services. As explained above,
however, the triple aim goals are far more likely to be achieved—and the
interests of consumers satisfied—if the idea of competition is more fully
embraced and fostered.
A more ambitious, but still realistic, solution would involve
heightened state-by-state legislative efforts to address fundamental
conceptions (and misconceptions) about which types of providers can
safely perform which categories of services. As FTC staff repeatedly has
suggested,139 state legislators who are drafting or reviewing specific
scope of practice bills should carefully scrutinize purported safety
justifications based on available empirical data as well as actual
experience (including, where possible, experience in other states with
less restrictive environments).
State legislators, along with the providers themselves, are not alone in
needing to rethink too-rigid categorizations regarding who performs
which services, and how well, and at what cost. In health care markets—
as in all markets—people do what they are paid to do, and seek to
maximize financial rewards. Therefore, we must also consider the
critical role of health care payers, which include private health insurance
companies, the federal government, and state governments. Ideally,
reimbursement policies at all levels, both public and private, would
become more agnostic regarding who has performed a given service, or
even affirmatively promote expanded provision of services by lowercost professionals, thus stimulating greater competition and creating
explaining how collaboration routinely occurs among all health care providers, including in states
without mandatory physician supervision of APRNs). See generally IOM FUTURE OF NURSING
REPORT, supra note 11, at 110–14 (reviewing examples of, and reasons for, physician resistance to
expanded nursing scope of practice; noting investment of significant lobbying resources “on the part
of organized medicine to oppose boundary expansion and to defeat proposed legislation in several
states to expand scope of practice for allied health care providers, including nurses. . . . [W]ith the
assistance of a special full-time legislative attorney hired for the purpose, [an alliance of medical
organizations] spearheaded several projects designed to obstruct expansion of scopes of practice for
nurses and others”).
139. See, e.g., Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n Staff to Jenny A. Horne, Representative, S.C.
House of Representatives 5 (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
advocacy_documents/ftc-staff-comment-south-carolina-representative-jenny.horne-regardinghouse-bill-3508-3078-advanced-practice-registered-nurse-regulations/151103scaprn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6D5-YHTF] (“[The proposed bill] would maintain supervision requirements that
many states have done without or eliminated, and would add a new layer of bureaucratic process to
meeting those requirements. Accordingly, we encourage you to consider whether these requirements
are necessary to assure patient safety in light of your own regulatory experience, the findings of the
IOM and other expert bodies, and the experience of other states.”).
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financial incentives to deploy the health care workforce more efficiently.
The volume-to-value shift in payment models, as well as greater
financial interdependence among all providers within a given health care
system, likely will encourage this approach. But as long as most health
care reimbursement follows a fee-for-service model, it will continue to
matter greatly who performs a given service and at what billing rate, and
reimbursement policy choices can act as powerful levers to change
behavior.
In the longer term, we urge states to consider whether licensure for
APRNs and similar professionals should be less rigid, and more like
licensure for physicians. To recall the example above, general practice
physicians are entrusted to decide, among other things, which services
they are qualified to provide according to the standard of care and which
patients should be referred to specialists.140 Unless there is reason to
believe that the ethical and other self-regulating incentives of APRNs
differ from those of physicians, a similar approach could be taken. The
empirical literature suggests that APRNs are highly competent at
determining which patients they can treat safely and which patients
should receive physician referrals.141 A more flexible approach to APRN
licensure would make it easier for the profession to adapt to changes in
the standard of care over time, and also would facilitate taking full
advantage of an individual professional’s qualifications, without
requiring constant legislative intervention. It might also become a model
for reform in other, similar areas of service overlap.
Our most provocative suggestion is to consider national licensure for
health care professionals, to insulate the licensure process from statelevel politics and mitigate the effects of silo-based turf battles that must
be fought jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction.142 For the most part, each type of
140. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text (explaining broad and undifferentiated
practice authority for physicians under all states’ medical practice acts); supra note 32 and
accompanying text (providing an example of a general practitioner determining her own
competency to read an x-ray and make a diagnosis).
141. See, e.g., NGA NP PAPER, supra note 16, at 7–8 (summarizing review of empirical literature
regarding APRN safety, concluding that quality of care provided by APRNs is not a concern, and
noting that “[m]ost studies showed that NP-provided care is comparable to physician-provided care
on several process and outcome measures”). Inherent in these and related quality findings is an
assumption that, when presented with issues beyond their skills or expertise, APRNs refer patients
to physicians.
142. In addition, a shift to national licensure would greatly enhance workforce mobility, because
state-based licensure makes it far more difficult for professionals to move from one state to another.
Many workers may choose their occupation with the understanding that it requires a State
license, but life events can intervene to change their expectations about the need to make a
cross-state move. For example, military spouses may have entered their field before marriage.
Other events—like a local disaster or a health crisis for a parent—may mean that workers who
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health care professional in this country is educated according to common
curricular and training standards for that profession, and certified and
licensed based on the results of a national examination.143 National
licensure also would promote interstate mobility as professionals move
around the country, which would help to ease provider shortages in
certain geographic areas. We recognize, however, that states rely on
licensure fees as a source of revenue, which likely would skew states’
financial incentives to cede their licensing authority, and Congress might
be reluctant to preempt long-standing state authority.
CONCLUSION
The health care marketplace is changing, and health care
professionals at all levels of the system are an integral part of that
change. If the national goals of lower cost, higher quality, and increased
had never planned to move across State lines after receiving a license suddenly find themselves
needing to do so. In such cases, the need to re-license is an important concern. If States don’t
offer a temporary license to practice (while re-certifying), then the financial barriers of
licensing are even more significant.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS & DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 39 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ASJ-TMGP]; see also
KLEINER, supra note 33 (analyzing influence of occupational licensing on geographic mobility); id.
at 20–21 (suggesting greater state-to-state reciprocity to reduce barriers to migration).
143. Using nursing as an example, all candidates for licensure as a registered nurse in the United
States and Canada sit for the same examination, known as the National Council Licensure
Examination (NCLEX-RN) and administered by the National Council of State Boards of Nursing.
NCLEX
and
Other
Exams,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
ST.
BOARDS
NURSING,
https://www.ncsbn.org/nclex.htm [https://perma.cc/DG57-GFF4] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016). While
each state’s board of nursing determines eligibility criteria to apply for RN licensure and sign up for
the NCLEX, every RN student in the country is expected to take the same examination and uphold
the same standards of care; therefore, nursing schools and nationally certified accreditation
organizations focus on designing and approving curricula around common criteria for scope and
quality. See, e.g., Accreditation and Schools of Nursing, NURSINGSCHOOL.ORG,
http://nursingschool.org/education/choosing/accreditation/ [https://perma.cc/MMQ3-DY3S] (last
visited Feb. 20, 2016). In addition, a number of state legislatures have considered or adopted bills
that would implement aspects of the APRN Consensus Model, which has been designed to align
requirements for licensure, accreditation, certification, and education for advanced practice nurses
in all states, and thereby facilitate licensure portability across state lines. See APRN Consensus
Model, AM. NURSES ASS’N, http://www.nursingworld.org/consensusmodel [https://perma.cc/
HUU8-JSS9] (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); APRN CONSENSUS WORK GRP. & NAT’L COUNCIL OF
STATE BDS. OF NURSING APRN ADVISORY COMM., CONSENSUS MODEL FOR APRN REGULATION:
LICENSURE, ACCREDITATION, CERTIFICATION & EDUCATION (2008), https://www.ncsbn.org/
Consensus_Model_for_APRN_Regulation_July_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA6M-USDZ]; see also
IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 11, at 23 (most RNs must pass standardized
licensing exam); id. at 196–97 (describing typical graduate-level education and certification
requirements for APRNs); Major Components of the Consensus Model by State, NAT’L COUNCIL
ST.
BOARDS
NURSING,
https://www.ncsbn.org/2014.07_18_Julymapwithpoints.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ESP4-RF48] (last updated Dec. 2015).
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access are to be achieved, the approach to regulating these varied
professionals must also change, and competition principles must play an
important role in any reformation. In the short term, responsible
legislators and regulators should be informed of the competitive
consequences of professional regulation. In particular, they should be
wary of the self-interested claims of health care providers whose
economic and professional sustainability are wedded to the status quo.
Legislators and regulators also should carefully scrutinize
unsubstantiated health and safety arguments that may mask
anticompetitive motives. In the long-term, however, locally-sourced,
silo-influenced, and highly specified regulations will need to give way to
more flexible, more adaptable, and less easily manipulated performance
and capability-based standards. Only then will we fully unleash the
incentives most likely to facilitate the emergence of a health care
services market tailored to the needs of the twenty-first century.

